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Of Public Funds and Public Participation:
Resolving the Issue of Agency Authority
to Reimburse Public Participants
in Administrative Proceedings
Carl W. Tobias*
A number of federal agencies have recently relied upon implied power to
reimburse expenses incurred by public participants in administrative proceedings.1 When the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) attempted to exercise this authority,
their efforts were challenged by parties who, relying on a purportedly controlling decision of the Second Circuit, 2 contended that participant funding was
an impermissible exercise of administrative power. The USDA initiative was
upheld in district court, 3 but the FDA program was invalidated by a divided
Fourth Circuit panel. 4
The dispute over agency reimbursement has not been confined to the
courts. Explicit and strong differences of opinion over citizen compensation
have also arisen in the legislative and executive branches of government.
Because the question of whether agencies have implied power to fund remains
a compelling and unresolved issue, it is an appropriate time to analyze this
complex problem.

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Montana. Legal consultant, Food and Drug
Administration. B.A. 1968, Duke University; LL.B. 1972, University of Virginia. The author
wishes to thank Professor Bari R. Burke, Dean Richard A. Merrill of the University of Virginia
Law School, Professor Thomas P. Huff, William A. Rossbach, Roy A. Schotland, and Harvey J.
Shulman for their suggestions, and James McKenna and Allan McGarvey for valuable research
assistance made possible by the Harris Trust. The views expressed in this Article are not necessarily those of the FDA.
1. The terms "reimbursement," "compensation," and "funding" are used interchangeably
in this Article to mean the voluntary payment from agency resources for fees and expenses
incurred by public participants in agency proceedings. "Authority" and "power" also are used
synonomously. "Implied authority" is used in a very general sense to describe the source of
agency power to make such payments. However, the authority is not "implied" in the sense that
power to incorporate a bank was implied in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819), from express powers to tax, borrow money, and regulate commerce, by way of the
necessary and proper clause of the Constitution. Congress has granted modern-day agencies
broad express substantive authority to regulate in the public interest, and has included in their
mandates general residuary clauses instructing agencies to do everything necessary to achieve that
goal, as well as residuary spending clauses instructing agencies to spend for all necessary expenses.
Thus, what was drawn by implication in McCulloch is expressly granted these agencies. The
question that has fueled the participant-funding debate, and that this Article attempts to resolve,
is the scope of this delegated authority, for while the residuary power is expressly granted, it does
not specifically address participant compensation.
2. Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 559 F.2d 1227 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1086 (1978).
3. Chamber of Commerce v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 459 F. Supp. 216 (D.D.C.
1978).
4. Pacific Legal Found. v. Goyan, 664 F.2d 1221 (4th Cir. 1981).

906

PUBLIC FUNDS

907

The first section of this Article is an historical survey of the developments
that have led to the extant disagreement in the judiciary, Congress, and the
agencies. In the next section, the cases treating participant reimbursement are
assessed, and thereafter a comprehensive analysis of the legal principles raised
by the exercise of implied compensation authority is presented. The Article
concludes with an evaluation of the performance of the funding programs to
date and the implications of this experience for implied reimbursement power.
I.

SURVEY OF THE DEVELOPMENTS IN PARTICIPANT REIMBURSEMENT

Many of the developments that led to disagreement within the judicial,
legislative, and executive branches over the question of agency funding authority occurred during the "Reformation of American Administrative
Law" 5 that has taken place in the last twenty years. These events may best be
examined by defining the problem that participant compensation was intended
to meet, by reviewing the origins of the concept of reimbursement, and by
surveying executive and legislative treatment of participant funding generally
and the authority issue specifically.

A. Definition of the Problem
Congress, in creating many administrative agencies, intended that they
regulate private behavior in the public interest. 6 The agencies exercise considerable discretion, and decisionmaking has become a fundamentally legislative
process in which regulators must ascertain and balance the competing contentions of the various private entities affected by administrative action. 7 Satisfactory performance of these tasks has been undermined, however, by the
significant disparity of participation in agency proceedings between commercial and noncommercial interests. 8 Industrial concerns have a substantial
stake in agency decisionmaking, and "generally possess the high degree of
involvement, the economic strength, and the organizational cohesion required
to present their views to the agencies consistently and coherently." 9 By

5. See Diver, Policymaking Paradigms and Administrative Law, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 393
(1981); Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1667
(1975).
6. For exemplary statutes, see 49 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976) (DOT); 15 U.S.C. § 2051(b)(l) (1976)
(CPSC). For discussions of the meaning of the term "public interest," see Gellhorn, Public
Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 Yale L.J. 359, 360 (1972); Lazarus & Onek, The
Regulators and the People, 57 Va. L. Rev. 1069, 1077 (1971).
7. See Stewart, supra note 5, at 1682-84, 1711-15.
8. This problem has been explored comprehensively in Cramton, The Why, Where and How
of Broadened Public Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 Geo. L.J. 525 (1972);
Gellhorn, supra note 6; Stewart, supra note 5. Imbalance in participation, however, is only one of
many theories propounded to explain administrative decisionmaking that seems biased toward
industry. See generally Crampton, supra, at 527-30; Stewart, supra note 5, at 1681-89, 1713-15;
Note, Federal Agency Assistance to Impecunious Intervenors, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1815, 1815-17
(1975).
9. Note, supra note 8, at 1816.
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contrast, those that might oppose positions of regulated parties generally are
diffused, and individually have a rather insignificant interest in the outcome
of any single proceeding. 10 While administrative determinations may have
considerable collective impact on them, 11 substantial transactions costs and
free-rider effects make problematic their organization for the purpose of
influencing agency choices on a continuing basis. 12
When nonindustry interests do not participate, administrative officials
cannot ascertain their views on issues of fact, law, or policy. Moreover, the
pervasive presence of regulated parties virtually ensures that the extra-agency
input upon which decisionmakers do rely in reaching determinations comes
almost exclusively from one source. Because input is provided predominantly
by commercial interests, it is not surprising that administrative choices reflect
industry perspectives. The imbalance in participation fundamentally undermines not only the appearance of fairness in agency decisionmaking but also
its substance.
In response to these and other considerations, officials in each branch of
government have taken action during the last fifteen years designed to expand
the opportunities for public involvement. Courts have required that members
of the public affected by agency determinations be permitted to participate in
administrative proceedings, and that decisionmakers accord "adequate consideration" to their views. 13 Since the mid-1960's, Congress has provided for
citizen involvement in a number of specific areas. 14 The executive branch also
has been active, with Presidents Ford and Carter strongly endorsing, and even
promoting, expanded public participation, 15 and with numerous agencies increasing possibilities for citizen involvement. 16 By 1975, as a result of judicial, legislative, and administrative action, public participation in agency
proceedings had become an accepted norm of the administrative process.
Merely creating the legal opportunity for citizen involvement, however,
was insufficient. Proponents realized that the "single greatest obstacle to
active public participation in regulatory proceedings" was the lack of finan-

10. See Cramton, supra note 8, at 529.
11. See Stewart, supra note 5, at 1715.
12. See id. at 1686, 1714-15; Cramton, supra note 8, at 529.
13. In the landmark case of Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966), the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the agency's
decision to prohibit "intervention on behalf of the public [that] would have vindicated the broad
public interest relating to a licensee's performance of the public trust inherent in every license."
Id. at 1006; see also National Welfare Rights Org. v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1970). For
comprehensive treatment of this trend, see Gellhorn, supra note 6; Stewart, supra note S, at
1748-60.
14. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1612 (1976) (Forest Service, USDA); 15 U.S.C. § 57a(c) (1976)
(FTC).

15. See, e.g., 41 Fed. Reg. 42,761 (1976); Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661
(1978); Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies from President Carter,
May 16, 1979, 1 Public Papers of the President, Jimmy Carter, 1979, at 867.
16. "In order to comply with the mandate of decisions like Church of Christ, most federal
agencies have expanded the scope of their intervention procedures." Note, supra note 8, at
1817-18 (footnote omitted); see, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 1.223 (1981) (FCC); 21 C.F.R. §§ 12.40, 12.45
(1981) (FDA).
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cial resources available to meet the considerable costs of involvement. 17 If
citizen participation could improve the quality of agency decisionmaking, it
seemed advisable to facilitate involvement by providing financial assistance.18 The idea of participant funding was developed to address these
concerns.
B. Origins of the Concept of Participant Reimbursement
The first serious consideration accorded by a governmental entity to the
idea of participant compensation appears to have occurred at the Administrative Conference of the United States during the late 1960's. 19 The Conference
recommended 20 that agencies "pay the personal expenses and wage losses
incurred by [indigent] individuals incident to their participation in rulemaking
hearings." 21 It urged Congress to appropriate funds for this purpose and
suggested that agencies with existing authority financially support public involvement.
During 1969, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) considered the idea
of compensation for indigent respondents in its unfair practice hearings. 22
Thereafter, the Commission sought the opinion of the Comptroller General
on agency authority to reimburse expenses incurred by both impecunious
respondents and indigent intervenors. The Comptroller responded affirma-

17. 3 Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Study on Federal
Regulation: Public Participation in Regulatory Agency Proceedings vii (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Public Participation Study]. Indeed, as early as 1966, even as Judge Burger was fashioning the
right of public participation, he recognized that the staggering "expense of participation in the
administrative process" would "operate to limit the number of those who will seek participation." Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1006
(D.C. Cir. 1966). For cost estimates, see Public Participation Study, supra, at 17-22; Cramton,
supra note 8, at 538; Gellhorn, supra note 6, at 389-96.
18. See, e.g., Public Participation Study, supra note 17, at chs. 1, 2 & 7; Public Participation
in Federal Agency Proceedings Act of 1977, Hearings on S. 270 Before the Subcomm. on
Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as S. 270 Hearings]; Public Participation in Federal Agency
Proceedings: Hearings on S. 2715 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as S.
2715 Hearings].
19. Congress created the Administrative Conference in 1964 and set out its most important
powers and duties in 5 U.S.C. § 574 (1976). The Conference is to "study the efficiency, adequacy,
and fairness of the administrative procedure used by administrative agencies in carrying out
administrative programs, and make recommendations to administrative agencies, collectively or
individually, and to the President, Congress or the Judicial Conference of the United States, in
connection therewith, as it considers appropriate." Id.
20. These recommendations were based on a study of representation of the poor in federal
rulemaking, conducted for the Conference by Professor Bonfield. See Recommendations Suggested to the Administrative Conference of the United States on the ·Basis of the Study of
Representation for the Poor in Federal Rulemaking I(b)(6}, reprinted in Bonfield, Representation
of the Poor in Federal Rulemaking, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 511, 556 (1969). The recommendations were
only a nascent form of the reimbursement concept.
21. Administrative Conf. of the United States, Representation of the Poor in Agency
Rulemaking of Direct Consequence to Them, in 1 Administrative Conf. of the United States,
Recommendations and Reports, 1968-1970, at 71 (1970) (recommendation No. 5).
22. American Chinchilla Corp., 76 F.T.C. 1016, 1037-38 (1969).
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tively, stating that such expenditure "would constitute a proper exercise of
administrative discretion." 23
By the early 1970's, considerable scholarly attention had been devoted to
participant funding. 24 In 1971, however, the Administrative Conference reconsidered citizen compensation in the context of a study examining public
participation in agency hearings. While the Conference affirmed the importance of citizen involvement, it rejected a recommendation endorsing the idea
of administrative reimbursement. 25
C. Implementation of the Reimbursement Concept

The concept of participant compensation did not receive intensive government consideration until the mid-1970's. A survey of developments thereafter reveals both that agency funding has aroused great interest and that it
has been accorded a mixed political and administrative reception. Funding
programs have been implemented at the direction of Congress under grants of
specific statutory authority and on the initiative of the agencies themselves
pursuant to implied powers. Neither Congress nor the agencies, however,
seem to have fixed ideas about the desirability, scope, or implementation of
administrative reimbursement programs. Examination of the administrative,
executive, and legislative activity provides a useful perspective for evaluating
judicial treatment of prior and potential challenges to compensation and for
predicting future developments in this unsettled area of administrative law.
1. Administrative and Executive Action on Participant Reimbursement.
Many federal agencies have exhibited interest in compensating members of the
public participating in the decisionmaking process. 26 In 1974, the Atomic
Energy Commission, later to become the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC), was first to announce that it would conduct rulemaking proceedings
on reimbursement27 and commissioned an independent study of the subject. 28
Informal rulemaking was commenced in 1975,29 but was terminated in the
following year when the agency decided against initiating a funding pro-

23. Letter from Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General, to Miles W. Kirkpatrick, Chairman,
FTC (Aug. 10, 1972) (reprinted in S. 2715 Hearings, supra note 18, at 281).
24. See Cramton, supra note 8, at 543-45; Gellhorn, supra note 6, at 394-97; Lazarus &
Onek, supra note 6, at 1098-1103.
25. Administrative Conf. of the United States, Public Participation in Administrative Pro·
ceedings, in 2 Administrative Conf. of the United States, Recommendations and Reports, 19701972, at 39-40 (1971) (recommendation No. 28).
26. In 1972, preceding the period of brisk agency interest in participant funding, the Federal
Trade Commission invoked its implied authority to fund one intervenor. See Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 1032 (1972).
27. The rulemaking was in response to a number of requests for financial assistance from
intervenors in nuclear licensing proceedings. See 41 Fed. Reg. 50,829 (1976).
28. See Boasberg, Hewes, Klores & Kass, Report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on
Policy Issues Raised by Intervenor Requests for Financial Assistance in NRC Proceedings 13
(1975) [hereinafter cited as NRC Report], reprinted in S. 2715 Hearings, supra note 18, at 331,
332. The study contract specifically excluded consideration of the agency's statutory authority to
fund. Id. at 14. This exclusion may perhaps be explained by the fact that the Commission had
decided to seek an opinion regarding its compensation power from the Comptroller General.
29. 40 Fed. Reg. 37,056 (1975).
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gram. 30 The Commission questioned its authority to extend financial assistance and concluded that the compensation issue could be resolved more
appropriately by Congress than by the individual agencies with their "necessarily restricted perspectives and mandates." 31 In 1980, the NRC again
expressed interest in funding public participants, inquiring of the Comptroller
General about an appropriations committee proscription of reimbursement. 32
Between 1976 and 1980, numerous agencies and departments, acting
pursuant to implied authority, initiated compensation rulemaking, promulgated funding regulations, established pilot programs, and reimbursed participants. In 1976, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) announced a
rule providing limited procedural assistance for indigent intervenors, 33 and the
FDA issued advance notice of proposed rulemaking on compensation. 34
During the next year, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) of the Department of Transportation (DOT) established a twelvemonth demonstration effort for participant funding. 35 Advance notices of
proposed rulemaking were issued by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) 36 and the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), 37 and proposed regulations
were published by the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) 38 and
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) of the Department of Commerce. 39 Even the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC), which as the Federal Power Commission (FPC) had previously
opposed the efforts of intervenors to secure agency funding, modified its
views. 40 The NOAA 41 and the CPSC 42 established reimbursement programs
in the spring of 1978, while the CAB issued its final regulations in December. 43 These agencies appear to have relied on opinions of the Comptroller
General supporting their assertion of implied spending authority. 44
30. See 41 Fed. Reg. 50,829 (1976).
31. Id. at 50,831. The Commission also stated that its decision to abandon the funding idea
rested on policy considerations as well as on reservations as to the scope of its authority. Id. at
50,829.
32. Letter from Leonard Bickwit, Jr., General Counsel, NRC, to Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General (Nov. 2, 1979). Congress, apparently reacting to a favorable response by the
Comptroller, inserted an explicit prohibition of reimbursement in the NRC's 1980 appropriation
measure, see infra notes 60 & 83 and accompanying text.
33. 41 Fed. Reg. 53,019 (1976). The regulation was in response to a petition of the Federal
Communications Bar Association. Id.
34. 41 Fed. Reg. 35,855 (1976).
35. See 42 Fed. Reg. 2863 (1977). The second part of the preamble to the regulation creating
the pilot effort was an advance notice of proposed rulemaking that invited public comment on the
advisability of establishing reimbursement on a "department wide and permanent basis." Id. at
2864.
36. 42 Fed. Reg. 1492 (1977).
37. 42 Fed. Reg. 8663 (1977).
38. 42 Fed. Reg. 15,711 (1977).
39. 42 Fed. Reg. 40,711 (1977).
40. Brief for the FERC on Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Greene County Planning Bd.
v. FERC, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
41. 43 Fed. Reg. 17,806 (1978).
42. 43 Fed. Reg. 23,560 (1978). The CPSC rule was termed an interim regulation, and the
program created was in the nature of a pilot effort. Id.
43. 43 Fed. Reg. 56,878 (1978). The proposed regulation appeared earlier at 43 Fed. Reg.
14,044 (1978). The FCC also published a Notice of Inquiry that year. 43 Fed. Reg. 30,834 (1978).
44. See the preambles accompanying the regulations cited supra notes 41 & 43.
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In 1979, President Carter circulated a memorandum urging the heads of
all departments and agencies to institute compensation efforts. 45 The
USDA 46 and the National Telecommunication and Information Administration of the Department of Commerce 47 issued notices of proposed rulemaking, and the FDA promulgated its final compensation regulations. 48 The
Department of Energy (DOE), however, suspended consideration of an unpublished reimbursement proposal pending legislative approval after Congress
proscribed expenditure of FERC appropriations on citizen funding. 49 In
1980, the USDA finalized its rule creating a funding program, and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) instituted a demonstration project
financially to assist qualified persons in commenting on proposed department
regulations. 50 Those agencies funding under implied authority discontinued
their programs in 1982, influenced by the adverse political climate and by
doubts about the scope of their power. 51
2. Opinions of the Comptroller General and the Office of Legal Counsel.
Government legal opinion has supported agency efforts to establish participant reimbursement programs and has been relied upon by the agencies. The
Comptroller General 52 has been a consistent and forceful proponent of this
exercise of power. In 1976, the Comptroller issued four opinions reaffirming
the position on implied funding authority initially articulated in the 1972 FTC
45. Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies from President Carter,
supra note 15.
46. 44 Fed. Reg. 17,507 (1979), relying on rationale advanced by the Comptroller General.
Id. at 17,508.
47. 44 Fed. Reg. 70,743 (1979), relying on rationale advanced by the Comptroller General.
Id. at 70, 744.
48. 44 Fed. Reg. 59,173 (1979). The proposed FDA regulations appeared earlier at 44 Fed.
Reg. 23,044 (1979) and also demonstrate reliance on the opinions of the Comptroller. Id. at
23,046.
49. See 44 Fed. Reg. 65,278 (1979). Section 103 of the Energy and Water Development
Appropriations Act of 1980 provides that "[n]one of the funds appropriated for Department of
Energy activities by this Act shall be used to pay expenses of, or otherwise compensate, parties
intervening in regulatory or adjudicatory proceedings funded in this Act." Pub. L. No. 96-69, 93
Stat. 437, 441 (1979).
50. 45 Fed. Reg. 6020 (1980) (USDA); 47 Fed. Reg. 29, 678 (1982) (NHTSA); 45 Fed. Reg.
83,171 (1980) (HHS). The Department of Housing and Urban Development also became inter·
ested in participant funding in 1980 and issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking. 45 Fed.
Reg. 14,068 (1980). However, it was subsequently instructed by Congress that it was not to spend
for reimbursement, see infra note 82 and accompanying text.
51. See 47 Fed. Reg. 9820 & 9861 (1982) (NOAA); 47 Fed. Reg. 12,789 (1982) (CPSC); 47
Fed. Reg. 12,951 (1982) (FDA); 47 Fed. Reg. 22,071 (1982) (USDA). The FDA was precluded
from funding by Pacific Legal Found. v. Goyan, 664 F.2d 1221 (4th Cir. 1981). The other
agencies also adverted to this case in explaining their decisions to discontinue their programs.
52. The Comptroller General is the head of the General Accounting Office (GAO), an
independent agency within the legislative branch created as a fiscal watchdog of the agencies.
Cibinic & Lasken, The Comptroller General and Government Contracts, 38 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
349 (1970); Morgan, The General Accounting Office: One Hope for Congress to Regain Parity of
Power with the President, 51 N.C.L. Rev. 1279, 1280-83 (1973). The preeminent work on the
GAO and the Comptroller General is still H. Mansfield, The Comptroller General (1939). There is
also a valuable new study, F. Mosher, The GAO: The Quest For Accountability In American
Government (1979). Congress has authorized the Comptroller General to render decisions respect·
ing the power of agencies to disburse funds. For further discussion of the Comptroller's author·
ity, see infra notes 145-53 and accompanying text.
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ruling. 53 Two of these decisions were responses to requests of the NRC and
the FDA, then engaged in reimbursement rulemaking; 54 the others were triggered by congressional inquiry. 55 In the four opinions, the Comptroller
stated that ten agencies-the FTC, the NRC, the FPC, the FDA, the BPA, the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), the CPSC, the Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC), the FCC, and the NHTSA-possess compensation authority. 56 He reasoned that Congress vests these agencies with responsibility
for protecting the public interest 57 through administrative decisionmaking and
annually appropriates to each agency funds "[f]or necessary expenses, not
otherwise provided for." 58 If public involvement is necessary to assist the
agencies in decisionmaking, authority to compensate citizen participants can
be implied from the substantive statutory mandates and residuary appropriation provisions. The Comptroller stated that this power could be exercised if
an agency believed (1) that it could not make a required determination without
reimbursing interested parties whose participation was necessary for disposition of the matter under consideration and (2) that these entities would
otherwise be unable to finance their involvement. 59
The Comptroller supplemented these rulings on agency funding authority
in a 1980 opinion for the NRC. 60 Although the House committee report
accompanying the Commission's 1980 appropriations act stated that no
money was to be paid to intervenors, the Comptroller found that the NRC still
might legally reimburse participants that year and that only an explicit statutory provision could bar citizen compensation. The Comptroller also declared
that the Greene County decision, 61 in which the Second Circuit had ruled that
the FPC lacked funding authority, was not binding on other agencies and
reiterated his earlier opinion that agencies possess reimbursement power.

53. See supra notes 22 & 23 and accompanying text.
54. See supra notes 27-31 & 48 and accompanying text. The rulings were included in Letter
from R.F. Keller, Deputy Comptroller General, to NRC (Feb. 19, 1976), reprinted in S. 270
Hearings, supra note 18, at 418 [hereinafter cited as Letter from R.F. Keller to NRC], and Letter
from R.F. Keller, Deputy Comptroller General, to FDA (Dec. 3, 1976), reprinted in id. at 455
[hereinafter cited as Letter from R.F. Keller to FDA].
55. Letter from R.F. Keller, Deputy Comptroller General, to Rep. John E. Moss, Chairman,
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
(May 10, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Letter from Keller to Moss], reprinted in S. 270 Hearings,
supra note 18, at 428; Letter from R.F. Keller, Deputy Comptroller General, to Rep. Yvonne
Brathwaite Burke, Congressional Black Caucus (Sept. 22, 1976), reprinted in id. at 439.
56. See Letter from Keller to Moss, supra note 55.
57. See, e.g., examples cited supra note 6.
58. See, e.g., Dep't of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1981, Pub.
L. No. 96-400, 94 Stat. 1681, 1683 (1980) (FAA appropriation).
59. Letter from Keller to Moss, supra note 55. The Comptroller later modified the first
criterion, saying that
[i]t would be sufficient if an agency determines that such participation "can reasonably
be expected to contribute substantially to a fair determination of" the issues before it,
even though the expenditure may not be "essential" in the sense that the issues cannot be
decided without such participation.
Letter from R.F. Keller, to FDA, supra note 54.
60. Decision of the Comptroller General, No. B-92288 (Jan. 25, 1980).
61. Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 559 F.2d 1227 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1086 (1978).
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The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the Justice Department also agreed
that agencies have funding authority. The Department of Transportation
asked the OLC whether its power to compensate intervenors was circumscribed by Greene County. 62 The OLC responded that the Greene County
holding was limited to funding authority under the Federal Power Act 63 and
that DOT was "required to interpret its own organic statute and any other
relevant statutory provisions," 64 to determine whether Congress had granted
it reimbursement power.
The OLC opinion troubled ranking members of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, who requested that then-Attorney General Bell review the Office's opinion. 65 The Attorney General concurred with the OLC's conclusion, 66 but the senators' inquiry illustrates recurrent congressional reserve on
the issue of participant funding.
3. The Legislative Response. Throughout this period, when departments
and agencies were formulating their positions on reimbursement and initiating
compensation programs, Congress assumed a comparatively passive posture,
responding rather erratically to the administrative initiatives. The legislature
provided for participant funding by some agencies in substantive statutes
while barring reimbursement by other agencies in appropriations acts. In
appropriations committee reports, Congress instructed a number of agencies
not to compensate, but also indicated that its failure to grant specific authority should not be interpreted as expressing an opinion that agencies lack
power. The legislative branch has neither approved nor disapproved proposals
that would either prescribe or proscribe funding by all federal agencies. While
a trend is evident-apparent congressional receptivity to participant reimbursement in the middle seventies replaced by a growing disenchantment with
the concept-ambiguity and lack of permanent direction probably best characterize the legislative approach to the reimbursement concept.
Congress initially addressed citizen compensation in 1974 during consideration of the Energy Reorganization Act. 67 In explaining deletion of a
Senate amendment that would have given the NRC specific reimbursement
authority, the conference committee stated that its failure to enact legislation
providing the agency with specific power did not mean that the Commission

62. Letter from Linda Heller Kamm, General Counsel, DOT, to John Harmon, Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Dep't of Justice (Oct. 27, 1977).
63. Letter from John M. Harmon, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel,
Dep't of Justice, to Linda Heller Kamm, General Counsel, DOT (Mar. 1, 1978).
64. Id. at 3.
65. Letter from Senator Eastland, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, and Senator
Thurmond, ranking minority member, to Griffin B. Bell, Attorney General (Mar. 17, 1978).
Letters from Senators Allen, Bartlett, H. Byrd, Curtis, Domenici, Garn, Helms, Laxalt, and
McClure evinced similar concerns.
66. Letter from Griffin B. Bell, Attorney General, to Senator Eastland (June 14, 1978).
67. Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233 (codified in scattered sections of 5 & 42 U.S.C.). As
early as 1972, Congress had included a form of participant compensation in the Consumer
Product Safety Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 2056(d)(2)(1976).
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lacked funding authority. 68 Congressional receptivity to funding became
more pronounced in the succeeding years, as the legislature in 1975 empowered the FTC to compensate participants in rulemakings under the MagnusonMoss Warranty Act, 69 and in 1976 granted the EPA similar authority under
the Toxic Substances Control Act. 10
In 1977, congressional treatment of funding became more ambivalent.
The legislative branch specifically authorized citizen reimbursement in Department of State proceedings. 71 Moreover, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, in a comprehensive study of federal regulation, acknowledged
that several agencies had instituted compensation efforts, specifically approved of them, and recommended that other agencies implement their own
programs pending enactment of general funding legislation. 72 The same year,
however, the House Appropriations Committee report for fiscal 1978 governing agricultural and related agencies-including USDA, FDA, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission-prohibited them from spending any
money on participant reimbursement. 73
The inconsistency in the congressional approach heightened in 1978.
Congress enacted legislation specifically authorizing participant compensation
by FERC,74 but in legislative history proscribed expenditure of appropriated
funds for that purpose. 75 Money was explicitly provided for implementation
of demonstration projects by the CAB and DOT, 76 but the Economic Regulatory Administration of the Department of Energy and the NRC were prohibited from reimbursing citizen-participants. 77 Finally, while the House appropriations bill would have again proscribed compensation by the agricultural
agencies, the proviso was deleted by the conference committee, which acknowledged that the agencies might undertake funding efforts. 78

68. H.R. Rep. No. 1445, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 5470, 5550-51.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h) (1976). The implementing regulation is at 16 C.F.R. § 1.17 (1981).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(4) (1976). The EPA issued a temporary rule implementing the
statutory provision in November, 1977. See 42 Fed. Reg. 60,911 (1977). See generally infra note
82.
71. 22 U.S.C. § 2692 (Supp. III 1979). See generally 43 Fed. Reg. 37,785 (1978).
72. See Public Participation Study, supra note 17, at 118-19.
73. H.R. Rep. No. 384, 95th Cong, 1st Sess. 96-97 (1977). However, the report does not
state that the proscription was imposed because the committee believed that the agencies lacked
implied reimbursement authority.
74. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, 16 U.S.C. § 825q-l (Supp. III 1979).
75. The prohibition appeared in the two committee reports. H.R. Rep. No. 1247, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1978); S. Rep. No. 1069, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1978).
76. The DOT received $125,000 and the CAB $150,000. H.R. Rep. No. 1329, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 10, 13 (1978).
77. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1979, Pub. L.
No. 95-465, 92 Stat. 1295 (Economic Regulatory Administration); H.R. Rep. No. 1490, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 112 (1978); S. Rep. No. 1069, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 116 (1978) (NRC). The
Economic Regulatory Administration proscription, which was originally contained in the House
bill but deleted in the Senate version, was restored in conference. H.R. Rep. No. 1672, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1978).
78. For a discussion of these legislative machinations, see 44 Fed. Reg. 23,044-45 (1979).
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Beginning in 1979, congressional opposition to the reimbursement concept became more pronounced. The legislature again prohibited the Economic
Regulatory Administration from compensating citizens and imposed similar
constraints on the other components of DOE. 79 Moreover, the conference
committees responsible for NRC, NHTSA, and CAB appropriations instructed those agencies that no funds were to be paid public intervenors. 80
The House Appropriations Committee, however, acquiesced in the continuing
USDA and FDA reimbursement efforts. 81
Extensive funding prohibitions were enacted in 1980. The appropriations
legislation for the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD),
"sundry independent agencies, boards [and] commissions" including CPSC
and EPA; 82 NRC; most components of the Department of Energy; 83 the
Economic Regulatory Administration 84 and all transportation agencies 85 proscribed the use of government money to support nonfederal regulatory intervention. Inclusion of the spending prohibitions in the appropriation statutes
themselves, rather than in the committee reports as in 1979, may have reflected congressional reaction to the Comptroller General's opinion that the

79. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-126, 93 Stat. 954, 972; Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-69, § 103, 93 Stat. 437, 441.
80. H.R. Rep. No. 388, 96th Cong., 1st Sess 1 (1979), incorporating by reference H.R. Rep.
No. 243, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 139 (1979) (NRC); H.R. Rep. No. 610, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 14
(1979) (NHTSA/CAB). The House Appropriations Committee in its report had deleted the
participant reimbursement funding for the NHTSA and the CAB, remarking that the "committee
believe[d] that NHTSA [could] develop a full record upon which to base informed decisions in the
public interest without the existence of a separate Federally financed public participation program," but giving no reason for deleting funds for the CAB. H.R. Rep. No. 272, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 35, 54 (1979). The Senate Appropriations Committee disagreed and restored appropriations
for both agencies. S. Rep. No. 377, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 27, 49 (1979). The conferees agreed
without explanation to delete the funds.
81. H.R. Rep. No. 242, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 29-30 (1979). The report summarized USDA's
funding program, warned that it would be scrutinized by Congress, and urged other committees
to consider the compensation issue.
82. Department of Housing and Urban Development-Independent Agencies Appropriations Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-526, § 410, 94 Stat. 3044, 3065. Due to an apparent mixup with
respect to the EPA's plans for expending funds on reimbursement-with the result that some
members of the House believed that agency officials had not told them the truth-the House
proscribed compensation by all of the agencies whose appropriations were grouped with that of
EPA. See H. Rep. No. 1114, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1980). The Senate Appropriations
Committee recommended that funds be provided for reimbursement in certain situations, S. Rep.
No. 926, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 118-19 (1980), but the Senate bill was amended on the floor so that
it closely paralleled the House prohibition. See 126 Cong. Rec. S13084 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1980),
Senator Danforth, who offered the amendment, stated that its "purpose .•. is to make clear that
no implied authority to create intervenor funding programs is recognized." Id.
83 . Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-367, § 502,
94 Stat. 1331, 1345 (proscribing reimbursement by NRC, DOE, and FERC). Some representatives
had expressed the view that intervenors contributed little to agency proceedings. See Hearings on
Energy and Water Development Appropriations for 1981 Before the Subcomm. on Energy and
Water Development of the House Appropriations Comm., 96th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 4, at 181-84,
196-203 (1980).
84. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1981, Pub. L.
No. 96-514, 94 Stat. 2957, 2976.
85. Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1981, Pub.
L. No. 96-400, § 316, 94 Stat. 1681, 1697. Included were the ICC, CAB, and NHTSA.
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committee reports lacked prescriptive effect. 86 Constraints were also imposed
upon FTC participant compensation. 87 By contrast, a Senate floor amendment that would have prohibited reimbursement by the agricultural agencies
failed. 88 Moreover, Congress enacted legislation providing for the award of
fees and expenses to prevailing parties in adversary adjudicatory proceedings
before administrative agencies, unless the agency position was substantially
justified or special circumstances would make an award unjust. 89 In 1981
Congress again used the appropriations process to proscribe funding, imposing restrictions virtually identical to those in 1980.90
During this period, Congress had many opportunities to adopt a comprehensive policy on agency compensation. In 1975 91 and 1977,92 Senator Kennedy introduced legislation that would have specifically authorized reimbursement by most agencies, and similar bills were offered in the House. 93 The
regulatory reform packages introduced in both Houses in 1979 also included
general funding provisions. 94 By contrast, the House Judiciary Committee
approved a provision of the proposed Regulatory Reform Act of 1980 proscribing agency compensation unless specifically authorized by law. 95 The

86. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
87. Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, § IO, 94
Stat. 374, 377-78. The restrictions reflect longstanding controversies over management of the
FTC reimbursement program. See S. Rep. No. 184, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-5 (1980); S. Rep. No.
500, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1980).
88. 126 Cong. Rec. Sl5,092, Sl5,096 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 1980). Senator Armstrong, who
offered the amendment, had stated that USDA lacked statutory authority to spend for participant
funding. Id. at Sl5,093-94.
89. See Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, §§ 201-208, 94 Stat. 2321,
2325-2330 (1980). See generally Dods & Kennedy, The Equal Access to Justice Act, 50 UMKC L.
Rev. 48 (1981).
90. Department of Housing and Urban Development-Independent Agencies Appropriations Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-101, 95 Stat. 1437 (1981) (HUD); Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-102, § 315, 95 Stat. 1442,
1460 (1981) (transportation agencies); Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-88, § 502, 95 Stat. 1135, 1148 (1981) (NRC/DOE/FERC). In addition, Congress
eliminated the CPSC offeror program, 15 U.S.C. § 2056 (1976), though the Commission was
permitted to continue reimbursing participants contributing to formulation of agency standards,
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 1202, 95 Stat. 357, 703-04
(1981). The agricultural agencies and the Department of Commerce were not instructed on
participant funding.
91. S. 2715, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
92. S. 270, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); see S. 270 Hearings, supra note 18.
93. E.g., H.R. 66, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 3361, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); see
Public Participation in Agency Proceedings: Hearings on H.R. 3361 and Related Bills Before the
Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Government Relations of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 3361 Hearings].
94. See, e.g., H.R. 3263, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 262, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S.
755, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 1291, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Regulatory Reform
Hearings on S. 104, S. 262, S. 299, S. 755 & S. 1251 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice
and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 2 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as S. 104 Hearings]. Measures specifically directed toward comprehensive
administrative reimbursement authority were introduced as well in the House. E.g., H.R. 284,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 2596, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
95. H.R. Rep. No. 1393, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, 56 (1980).
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Senate Governmental Affairs Committee voted out a similar measure in
1981.96 None of the proposed regulatory reform legislation has been enacted.
Thus, congressional action on agency reimbursement remains a patchwork quilt. Neither broadly approving nor disapproving the funding concept,
and indeed without addressing explicitly the organic compensation authority
of agencies, the legislative branch has repeatedly relied upon the annual
appropriations process to express an ambiguous and contradictory policy. 97
Against this backdrop, several courts have ruled on the validity of implied
agency reimbursement authority.

II.

PARTICIPANT REIMBURSEMENT AND THE COURTS

In contrast to the considerable involvement of the executive and legislative branches in the funding issue, few administrative-reimbursement cases
have reached the courts. The paucity of litigation is probably attributable to
the unsettled state of the compensation concept and the uncertain status of
many agency programs. If participant reimbursement were to become a more
institutionalized administrative concept, judges might be asked to accord
increased consideration to the theoretical and practical problems involved.
Despite the currently limited judicial involvement, however, courts deciding
the cases reported to date 98 treat the fundamental issues of statutory interpretation and interaction among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches
as central to the funding debate, and thus their opinions merit scrutiny.

96. Telephone interview with Glenn Smith, Minority Counsel, Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, Nov. 12, 1981.The Senate has subsequently approved the measure, 127 Cong.
Rec. S. 2605-07 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1982).
97. Appropriations measures do not speak to the issue of underlying substantive administrative authority and are controlling only with regard to the funds appropriated therein. A prohibition on funding included in an appropriation statute would bar an agency from spending on
reimbursement, even if its organic statute expressly authorized it to do so. If the prohibition were
not renewed, that agency could resume funding the following year out of general agency monies.
98. Beside the cases discussed in this section of the text, several other cases have touched on
the participant reimbursement issue. In one case, plaintiff challenged the exercise of funding
authority by the Department of Energy. The court did not, however, reach the merits of the
compensation issue. See Chamber of Commerce v. Dep't of Energy, 627 F.2d 289 (D.C. Cir.
1980). There also are several earlier decisions that allude to participant compensation but do not
meaningfully treat the question of agency reimbursement power. See Natural Resources Defense
Council v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 645 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519
(1978); Citizens for a Safe Environment v. AEC, 489 F.2d 1018, 1022-23 (3d Cir. 1974); Calvert
Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1118-19 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966);
see also York Comm. for a Safe Environment v. NRC, 527 F.2d 812, 816 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
Citizens for Safe Power v. NRC, 524 F.2d 1291, 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring); American Pub. Power Ass'n v. FPC, 522 F.2d 142, 147 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Bazelon, C.J.,
concurring); Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 420 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 849 (1972).
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A. Greene County
The Second Circuit en bane decision in Greene County Planning Board v.
FPC, 99 issued in 1977, culminated nearly a decade of controversial administrative and courtroom litigation over the construction of power lines in rural New
York state. Several intervenors had persuaded the FPC to select a route less
damaging to the environment than that initially recommended by the Commission staff. The intervenors twice asked the agency to pay their participation costs, but their petitions were denied. On appeal of the first denial, a
three-judge panel of the Second Circuit declined to order reimbursement
because Congress had not specifically authorized it. 100 While the intervenors'
appeal of the second adverse agency determination was pending, however, the
Comptroller General issued the opinion finding that the FPC possessed compensation power. A different panel then modified the earlier ruling. It deferred to the Comptroller's position, 101 agreeing that authorization for funding of indigent intervenors who contribute significantly to Commission
hearings could reasonably be found in the agency's statutory mandate. The
panel considered the Comptroller's opinion authoritative and stated that it
could not be overturned unless clearly contrary to law. However, the court did
not order the Commission to reimburse the participants, but rather remanded
the matter to the agency to determine whether compensation was appropriate
in the particular instance.
The three-judge panel was reversed in a 5-3 decision of the Second Circuit
sitting en bane. Although the court declared that there was no statutory basis
for participant funding by the FPC, the precise holding in Greene County is
ambiguous. It can be interpreted as broadly denying agency authority to
reimburse public participants except pursuant to specific statutory powers.
This view is supported by the court's reliance on the general spending restraint
of 31 U.S.C. § 628, which provides that "sums appropriated for the various
branches of expenditure in the public service shall be applied solely to the
objects for which they are respectively made, and for no others." Moreover,
the majority never explicitly examined whether the FPC might have possessed
implicit compensation authority, possibly indicating a fundamental rejection
of the implied power concept.
The Greene County decision may, however, also have been based on the
particular posture of the litigation. The en bane court perceived a violation of
the American rule against shifting of fees and expenses between parties to
disputes. Because the FPC derived most of the funds for administering its
utility licensing program from annual charges assessed licensees, the court
may have believed that an FPC award to public intervenors who participated
in a utility licensing proceeding would amount to proscribed fee-shifting.
99. 559 F.2d 1227 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978). For fine discussions of
this case, see Note, 66 Geo. L.J. 931 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Georgetown Note]; Note,
Funding Public Participation in Agency Proceedings, 27 Am. U.L. Rev. 981 (1978).
100. Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 426 (2d Cir. 1972).
101. Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 559 F.2d 1227, 1234-35 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

920

[Vol. 82:906

The Second Circuit observed as well that the FPC had never deemed itself
empowered to pay intervenors' expenses. The court regarded this as very
important, because the interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with
its administration is ordinarily entitled to considerable deference. The majority's position on the judicial deference to be accorded opinions of the Comptroller General, however, was quite different. The Second Circuit flatly
refused to defer to the Comptroller on the question of agency reimbursement
authority. Indeed, it seemed to view the dispute as presenting a clash between
judicial power and that of the Comptroller General, declaring that the courts
and not the Comptroller must "determine the intent of Congress as expressed
in its legislative enactments." 102
B. Chamber of Commerce and Goyan
Two cases decided subsequent to Greene County raise similar issues, but
in factually converse contexts. In the Second Circuit litigation, the administrative agency argued that it lacked the power to compensate; in the later cases
parties opposed to funding challenged agency findings of authority. Nevertheless, the concept of implied reimbursement power received a mixed judicial
reception.
1. Chamber of Commerce. Chamber of Commerce v. United States
Department of Agriculture 103 involved a challenge to the USDA's exercise of
an assumed, implied power to pay for extra-agency factfinding. The Agriculture Department had exercised this authority in a proceeding to establish
standards for shrinkage of meat and poultry products during distribution.
Because the USDA believed that it had insufficient data on the consumer
impact of the existing and proposed regulations, 104 the Department, after
soliciting bids, contracted with the Consumer Federation of America (CFA)
for an analysis of the economic effects of the proposed rules. Plaintiffs, who
had consistently opposed the proposed net-weight regulations, sued to enjoin
the USDA from paying for or using the CFA study. They contended that the
Department lacked the authority to procure such a study.
The court rejected plaintiffs' claims and upheld the exercise of power to
fund. It found support for the USDA's position on implied reimbursement
authority in the broad powers delegated to the Department under the Wholesome Meat Act 105 and the Wholesome Poultry Products Act 106 as well as the
USDA appropriations statutes, which permit the agency to expend "such
sums as are necessary" 107 to effectuate the mandates of the substantive acts.
The court did not expressly defer to the Comptroller's opinions but relied on
their reasoning and cited them authoritatively. Greene County was distinguishable, because the USDA found that it possessed implied power, a deterId. at 1239.
459 F. Supp. 216 (D.D.C. 1978).
Id. at 218-19.
21 u.s.c. §§ 601-95 (1976).
106. Id. §§ 451-70.
107. Id. §§ 469, 680.

102.
103.
104.
105.
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mination entitled to deference, and because compensation from the Department's congressional appropriation was not deemed to be fee shifting
proscribed by the American rule.
Though the court addressed the issues underlying the question of implied
funding authority, it is not clear that the facts involved an exercise of implied
compensation power. Contracting with a group to conduct a consumer study
to supplement the data base in an informal notice-comment rulemaking proceeding is not identical to reimbursing someone to advocate a particular
perspective in a formal adjudicatory proceeding. Whether an agency could
compensate in the latter situation was a question subsequently raised in Pacific Legal Foundation v. Goyan. 108 In the final analysis, however, the
general principle involved in both cases is similar: whether agencies possess
similar authority to pay members of the public who can reasonably be expected to contribute to a full and fair determination of the issues involved in
administrative proceedings but who might otherwise be unable to participate
because of a lack of resources.
2. Goyan. Goyan involved a challenge to FDA participant funding. The
plaintiffs sought to invalidate a pilot program for reimbursing private parties
participating in certain agency proceedings. The FDA had instituted the compensation effort pursuant to its implied powers, relying principally upon the
theory propounded in the Comptroller General's opinions. 109
The district court in Goyan approved the FDA funding program, taking a
broad view of the administration's statutory mandate. It treated peremptorily
the argument that agencies could fund only by specific legislative prescription,
and explicitly found 31 U.S.C. § 628 inapplicable. The court distinguished
Greene County, rejecting analogies to fee shifting and the American rule and
emphasizing the Second Circuit's own deference to agency interpretation. The
court relied in part upon the Comptroller General's opinions for its ruling that
the agency had implied power. It also found a measure of specific
congressional authorization for the FDA experiment in the legislative histories
of the 1979 and 1980 appropriations bills, in which Congress indicated its
awareness and tacit approval of the FDA's contemplated reimbursement program.110
In a cursory opinion, a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed. m
Marshaling support from Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society112 and Greene County, despite the differences between those cases and
Goyan, the court trumpeted "the continuing vitality of the rule that, absent
congressional authority to the contrary, participants pay their own way in
legal proceedings." 113 The majority also stated that the legislature's failure,

108. 500 F. Supp. 770 (D. Md. 1980), rev'd, 664 F.2d 1221 (4th Cir. 1981).
109. Compare 44 Fed. Reg. 23,044, 23,045, 23,047 (1979) with sources cited supra notes 54 &

55.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See supra text accompanying notes 78 & 81.
664 F.2d 1221 (4th Cir. 1981).
421 U.S. 240 (1975), discussed infra notes 129 & 130 and accompanying text.
1\64 F.2d at 1225.
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on several occasions, specifically to authorize compensation by all agencies, 114
and its specific provision for participant funding by some agencies 115 meant
that reimbursement power could not be implied from general agency authority. Finally, the court found unreliable the inferences drawn from the appropriations materials by the district court, adopted the Second Circuit's position
rejecting deference to the Comptroller, and concluded that it was the role of
Congress, and not the agencies, to assume the initiative on participant compensation.116
Judge Murnaghan, the dissenting member of the Fourth Circuit panel,
filed a better reasoned opinion. Recognizing the pervasive and necessary
function of implicit powers in hierarchical government, he speculated that the
majority's rejection of the FDA program reflected antipathy to the use of
government money to promote partisan viewpoints. The dissent observed,
however, that "[o]pposing expressions of competing and biased views, even if
they are exaggerated or contradictory presentations of the facts, will often
lead to a middle ground of truth and accuracy built on the existence of
mutually modifying contrary contentions." 117 Judge Murnaghan reasoned
that redress of the input imbalance attributable to resource inequality among
the proponents of various views was perfectly compatible with existing FDA
authority and function and a matter particularly appropriate for judicial
deference.
The legal issues raised by the establishment of compensation programs
pursuant to implied authority are identified, but not comprehensively or
clearly developed in the cases. The majorities in Greene County and Goyan
have truncated analysis by drawing overly broad analogies from the American
rule against fee shifting and by relying too greatly upon ambiguous congressional expressions. These cases, however, will probably not be the final judicial word on participant funding. Because the legislative status of regulatory
reimbursement remains uncertain, primary responsibility for defining the permissibility, and even the scope, of agency-initiated compensation programs
may well remain with the courts. Future judicial decisions will not only be
important for the specific controversies they decide, but also may affect the
substance and timing of eventual congressional resolution of the specific
funding authorization issue. The same legal policies that argue for implied
reimbursement power may recommend specific congressional action, as continued administration of agency-initiated programs generates operative experience on the basis of which specifically authorized efforts may later be fashioned. There remains, therefore, a need for clear, reasoned, and systematic
114. The opinion cited, inter alia, S. 1081, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), and S. 405, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). 664 F.2d at 1225-26 n.12; see also supra text accompanying notes 91-94.
115. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
116. The state court analogue of the majority opinions in Greene County and Goyan is
Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. Public Util. Comm'n, 25 Cal. 3d 891, 603 P.2d 41, 160
Cal. Rptr. 124 (1979). See generally Note, Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. Public
Utilities Comm'n: The PUC's Power to Award Attorney Fees, 69 Calif. L. Rev. 969, 997-1000
(1981).
117. 664 F.2d at 1228.
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articulation of legal issues relating to the exercise of implied compensation
power. The following section identifies and develops these issues.

III. A

SUGGESTED ANALYSIS OF AGENCY

REIMBURSEMENT AUTHORITY

A. The Concept of Implied Authority

There is no gainsaying the constitutional truism recited in Greene County
that "[t]he authority of a Commission to disburse funds must come from
Congress." 118 Compensation by an agency pursuant to a grant of specific
statutory power from Congress is, of course, a valid exercise of delegated
authority. But Congress obviously cannot delegate explicitly for every contingency that departments and agencies might encounter. Not surprisingly, therefore, it is well established that federal agencies possess implied as well as
express statutory authority.
The Supreme Court held long ago that the Secretary of the Treasury had
implied power to require oaths when paying claims, declaring it to be "a
general principle of law, in the construction of ... powers ... that where the
end is required, the appropriate means are given." 119 Modern-day courts
continue to adhere to the doctrine of implied statutory authority, 120 the Second Circuit itself observing that "[i]t has been the law at least since McCulloch v. Maryland ... that the lawful delegation of a power carries with it the
authority to do whatever is reasonable and appropriate properly to effectuate
the power." 121 Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized that the general
doctrine of implied authority extends to the disposition of the rights and
property of the federal government, 122 presumably including the disbursement
of public money for participant funding.
A body of case law respecting the implied powers of particular administrative agencies also has developed. The FPC, found not to possess implied
reimbursement authority in Greene County, is a useful paradigm. Numerous
federal appeals court panels have recognized that the broad scope of the
118. Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 559 F.2d 1227, 1239 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
119. United States v. Bailey, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 238, 255 (1835). See generally McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
120. E.g., Pan Am. World Airways v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963); United States v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 323 U.S. 612 (1945); Lehigh & N.E. Ry. v. ICC, 540 F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1061 (1977); Soriano v. United States, 494 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1974); Niagara
Mohawk Power Corp. v. FPC, 379 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Morrow v. Clayton, 326 F.2d 36
(10th Cir. 1963).
121. Gallagher's Steak House Inc. v. Bowles, 142 F.2d 530, 534 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 322
U.S. 764 (1944).
122.
Power to release or otherwise dispose of the rights and property of the United States is
lodged in the Congress by the Constitution. Art. IV, § 3, Cl. 2. Subordinate officers of
the United States are without that power, save only as it has been conferred upon them
by Act of Congress or is to be implied from other powers so granted.
Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289, 294 (1941) (emphasis added).
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Commission's powers includes by implication the unstated but requisite authority for effective discharge of its duties. 123 The Seventh Circuit, for
example, held that the FPC had implied power to establish uniform accounting regulations for its licensees, although no such authority was specifically
granted in the agency's enabling statutes. 124
The test of whether the doctrine of implied powers permits a particular
agency to spend in a manner not specifically prescribed by statute will depend
on the statutory scope of the agency's authority in general, the existence of an
explicit residuary powers or spending clause in its enabling or appropriations
legislation, and the nature of the expenditure. An administrative body to
which Congress has given a general public interest mandate, a wide range of
regulatory responsibilities, and a panoply of administrative devices for effecting the mandate may logically possess implied, adjunct powers to expeditiously implement those specifically provided. Grants of broad statutory authority to undertake such actions or to "make such expenditures as are
necessary to execute [agency] functions" 125 also indicate that the scope of
these agency powers includes participant compensation. So long as an expense
is reasonably necessary and fairly appropriate to efficacious agency decisionmaking, it is no different from any other exercise of an implicit administrative
prerogative. Funding members of the public whose participation in proceedings improves the decisional process and contributes to an appearance of fair
treatment and consequent public acceptance of agency action comes within
the ambit of the power delegated.
The venerable admonition 126 of 31 U.S.C. § 628 that "sums appropriated
... shall be applied solely to the objects for which they are respectively made,
and for no others" does not preclude exercise of implied spending authority to
reimburse participants or otherwise. As the Comptroller General has consistently maintained, 127 where Congress has allocated funds for a particular
123. In Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FPC, 379 F.2d 153, 158 (D.C. Cir. 1967), the court
declared:
The [Federal Power] Act is not to be given a tight reading wherein every action of the
Commission is justified only if referable to express statutory authorization. On the
contrary, the Act is one that entrusts a broad subject-matter to administration by the
Commission, subject to Congressional oversight, in the light of new and evolving
problems and doctrines.
Id. at 158; see Mesa Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 441 F.2d 182, 187 (5th Cir. 1971); Public Serv.
Comm'n v. FPC, 327 F.2d 893, 896-97 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC,
142 F.2d 943, 952 (10th Cir. 1944), aff'd, 324 U.S. 581 (1945); Hartford Elec. Light Co. v. FPC,
131 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 741 (1943); see also Permian Basin Area Rate
Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 776 (1968).
124. Northern States Power Co. v. FPC, 118 F.2d 141, 143 (7th Cir. 1941).
125. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 793 (1976).
126. The current Code section has its source in Act of Mar. 3, 1809, ch. 28, § 1, 2 Stat. 535,
which provided for the financial regulation of the Treasury, War, and Navy Departments.
127.
While 31 U.S.C. § 628 (1970) prohibits agencies from using appropriated funds except
for the purposes for which the appropriation was made, we have long held where an
appropriation is made for a particular object, purpose, or program, it is available for
expenses which are reasonably necessary and proper or incidental to the execution of the
object, purpose or program for which the appropriation was made, except as to expenditures in contravention of law or for some purpose for which other appropriations are
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purpose, an expenditure that is reasonably necessary to effectuate that purpose may logically be considered application of funds for an object of congressional appropriation. Indeed, the residuary spending clauses, allowing
agencies to spend for "all necessary expenses," can be viewed as satisfying the
requirement that administrative expenditures be appropriately limited. A
more literal and restrictive interpretation of section 628 would sacrifice the
administrative flexibility needed for faithful and effective implementation of
congressional intent. It could, moreover, threaten the legality of a wide range
of agency actions previously authorized by the Comptroller pursuant to the
notion of implied spending authority.1 2 s
B. Fee Disbursement and Fee Shifting
Although the implied power concept is sufficiently broad to include the
disbursement authority delegated to the agencies, it is not the only factor that
must be considered in evaluating the compensation power of specific agencies.
Administrative rulemaking proceedings in which citizen participants oppose
positions of industry and adjudicatory proceedings in which public intervenors challenge industry petitions seeking authorization for certain activities
assume an adversarial cast. Reimbursing entities involved in these proceedings
may appear to violate the American rule, which proscribes shifting of fees and
expenses from losing to prevailing parties in legal contests. The Supreme
Court recently upheld the doctrine in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 129 declaring that "absent statute or enforceable contract, litigants pay their own attorneys' fees." 130

made specifically available. 6 Comp. Gen. 621 (1927); 17 id. 636 (1938); 29 id. 421
(1950); 44 id. 312 (1964); 50 id. 534 (1971); 53 id. 351 (1973).
Letter from R.F. Keller to NRC, supra note 54, at 420.
128. See United States v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 416 F. Supp. 313 (D.N.J. 1976).
129. 421 U.S. 240 (1975). The Supreme Court in Alyeska reversed the District of Columbia
Circuit's award of attorneys' fees to be paid by the builders of the Alaskan oil pipeline to several
environmental public interest groups that had opposed its construction. The court of appeals had
relied upon its equitable powers and the theory that the opponents of the project were entitled to
expenses because they had acted as "private attorneys general" in vindicating important public
interests. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1974). For a comprehensive
discussion of the factual background of this litigation, see Dominick & Brody, The Alaska
Pipeline: Wilderness Society v. Morton and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 23 Am.
U.L. Rev. 337 (1973). Other recent cases upholding the longstanding American rule include F.D.
Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116 (1974); Hall v. Cole, 412
U.S. l (1973); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967). The
administrative analogue of Alyeska is Turner v. FCC, 514 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Cf. Office
of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 465 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (FCC
possessed authority to approve voluntary agreements calling for fee shifting between parties to
administrative proceedings).
The finding in Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. Public Util. Comm'n, 25 Cal. 3d
891, 909-10, 603 P.2d 41, 51-52, 160 Cal. Rptr. 124, 134-35 (1979), that the Public Utilities
Commission (PUC) lacked authority to shift fees between parties to a ratemaking proceeding, is
similar to the holding in Turner. The same court also found, however, that the PUC was
empowered to shift fees between parties to a reparation proceeding because of its quasi-judicial
character. Id. at 907-09, 603 P.2d at 50-51, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 133-34. See generally Note, supra
note 116. The Colorado Supreme Court has found that the PUC was authorized to shift fees
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I. Prototypal Fee Disbursement. Fee shifting between parties and fee
disbursement from agency appropriations are similar in that each relieves an
entity involved in a legal proceeding of the expense incurred when attempting
to vindicate a legal position. By indiscriminately applying the proposition
articulated in Alyeska that parties to legal disputes pay their own way, the
American rule could be expanded to encompass not only fee shifting, but also
fee disbursement. There are persuasive reasons, however, why extension of
the American rule against fee shifting to include generic participant compensation would be inappropriate.
Three policy grounds have been articulated in support of the American
rule: 131 that persons, especially those who are impecunious, should not be
penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit; that the time, cost,
and difficulties of proof inherent in resolving the question of what constitute
reasonable litigation expenses would substantially burden judicial administration; and that independent advocacy might be threatened if attorneys' earnings were determined by the judge before whom they argue. The first rationale
and its corollary-"that the poor might be unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing included the fees
of their opponents' counsel" 132-are inapplicable to participant funding. Because costs of reimbursing participants are not borne by the losing party, but
are paid from money appropriated to the agency, no penalty is imposed upon
unsuccessful litigants and no deterrent effect results.
The possibility of using decentralized decisionmakers to process compensation applications and requests for reimbursement tempers the force of the
latter two arguments. Determining the amount of reimbursement to be paid
need not unduly burden agency administration because the agencies generally
do not treat the issue of reasonableness of fees and expenses as one for
resolution through litigation. Most agencies set fee schedules in advance and
relegate to fiscal officials the responsibility for settling disagreements about
the amount of compensation to be paid. 133 To the extent that agencies subject
disputes over expenses to resolution in an adjudicatory context, the procedures generally do not involve the agency officer who conducted the proceeding in which costs were incurred. 134 Providing separate personnel and proce-

between parties to a ratemaking proceeding. See Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 576 P .2d 544 (Colo. 1978).
Much has been written about the American rule. See, e.g., Special Project, Recent Developments in Attorneys' Fees, 29 Vand. L. Rev. 685, 719-33 (1976); Note, Defrosting the Alyeska
Chill: The Future of Attorneys' Fees Awards in Environmental Litigation, 5 Envtl. Aff. 297
(1976); Comment, Alternatives for the Recovery of Attorneys' Fees in Environmental Litigation
after Alyeska v. Wilderness Soc'y, 16 Nat. Resources J. 1003 (1976); Comment, Attorneys' Fees
in Public Interest Litigation: A Return to the Wilderness of the American Rule, 28 U. Fla. L. Rev.
240 (1975).
130. 421 U.S. at 257.
131. F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974);
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co. 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967).
132. Id. at 718.
133. See; e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 904 (1981) (NOAA); 21 C.F.R. §§ 10.250, 10.275 (1980) (FDA).
134. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 10.275 (1981).
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dures for the specific purpose of handling reimbursement requests minimizes
the difficulties that attend judicial awards of fees and expenses.
Decentralized decisionmaking on funding applications and reimbursement requests also means that agency compensation need not endanger independent advocacy in administrative proceedings. Most agencies do not place
ultimate responsibility for ascertaining whether and in what amount funding
should be awarded with the officer who conducts the proceeding for which
compensation is sought. 135 Reimbursed participants, thus, would have little
incentive to tailor their presentations to satisfy the agency officials before
whom they appear. It is conceivable, of course, that administrative staff
members who process applications might be more favorably disposed toward
the funding requests of those applicants who indicate a willingness to advocate
the position espoused by the agency. 136 Agencies have guarded against this,
however, by insulating employees with final decisionmaking authority on
citizen compensation from the substantive administrative proceedings. 137
Fee disbursement, moreover, is not burdened by the restrictive historical
legacy that attends fee shifting. 138 Alyeska was rendered in the context of a
long line of decisions upholding the American rule, comprehensive legislation
governing costs and docketing fees that does not provide for fee shifting, and
statutes authorizing recovery of fees and expenses in particular kinds of
cases. 139 None of these considerations applies to fee disbursement. There is
no longstanding proscription of administrative reimbursement of public participants, and Congress has enacted substantive measures governing compensation on only a few occasions.
Finally, the essential character of reimbursement is very different from
fee shifting. As Judge Lumbard, dissenting in Greene County, observed, fee
disbursement "involves no direct exercise of compulsion against a private
party." 140 The benefit to the fee recipient does not come at the expense of
legal adversaries. The analogy to fee shifting also fails because of the fundamentally disparate functions of administrative and judicial decisionmakers.
As Judge Murnaghan observed in Goyan, the agency does not act merely as a
disinterested referee supervising a private controversy, but actively pursues the
advancement of the public good. 141 The reimbursement principle legitimately
135. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. §§ 12.6, 12.7 (1981) (USDA); 14 C.F.R. §§ 304.7, 304.8 (1981)
(CAB). However, some agencies do give the presiding officer in the proceeding a recommendatory
function. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 10.215 (1981) (FDA); 16 C.F.R. § 1.17(d) (1) (1981) (FTC).
136. This is one charge of abuse in the administration of reimbursement programs leveled by
opponents of compensation. See, e.g., S. 270 Hearings, supra note 18, at 10-16.
137. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 12.2(f) (1981) (USDA); 14 C.F.R. § 304.7(a) (1981) (CAB).
Moreover, the objective nature of the criteria that must be satisfied before reimbursement can be
awarded should afford some additional protection. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 10.220(c)(3) (1981)
(FDA).
138. See Georgetown Note, supra note 99, at 943-44.
139. See Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 559 F.2d 1227, 1242-43 (2d Cir. 1976)
(Lumbard, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
140. Id. at 1242 (citation omitted); accord Chamber of Commerce v. United States Dep't of
Agriculture, 459 F. Supp. 216, 221 (D.D.C. 1978).
141. Pacific Legal Found. v. Goyan, 664 F.2d 1221, 1228 (4th Cir. 1981) (Murnaghan, J.,
dissenting). See generally Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
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"calls for the United States itself to pay for the valuable services performed in
furtherance of the public interest" 142 and promotes positive values of citizen
involvement and informed decisionmaking.
The uncritical and undifferentiated analogies drawn by the Second and
Fourth Circuits to classical fee shifting, and the support they invoke from
Alyeska and its antecedents, are unwarranted. Policy and historical rationales
argue against extending the American rule on shifting of fees and expenses
between litigants to include disbursements from agency appropriations for
costs of public participation in administrative proceedings. Whether the
American rule applies to citizen compensation paid primarily from charges
assessed against agency licensees is, however, a closer question.
2. Disbursement by Agencies Supported by Regulated Entities. Participant funding by agencies whose administrative expenses are paid mainly with
the fees of regulated parties closely resembles the fee shifting discountenanced
by the American rule. The money awarded participants would come from
their adversaries in the administrative proceedings, the commercial entities
whose positions they have challenged. For example, regulated utilities paid
nearly all of the costs incurred by the FPC in operating its licensing program,
and the Commission in Greene County successfully contended that compensation of public intervenors would in effect be impermissible fee shifting. 143
Yet, while disbursement paid out of licensee charges has the appearance
of fee shifting, and although Greene County can be understood as limited to
the effect produced by this type of disbursement, the analogy to the American
rule must be rejected here as well. Even if this disbursement is assumed to be
operatively similar to classical fee shifting, the administrative context and the
agency-licensee relationship remove reimbursement from the strictures of the
otherwise applicable rule. The powers of the agency to issue licenses and exact
licensing fees to cover administrative costs are one with its regulatory responsibilities, hearing and rulemaking authority, and legislative mandate to undertake all actions and pay all expenses necessary to implement its statutory
duties. Funding that facilitates efficacious decisionmaking is a legitimate
exercise of agency authority that does not violate the American rule, despite
an appearance of fee shifting.
More fundamentally, though, scrutiny of the purposes, policies, and
effects of reimbursement leads to the conclusion that reimbursement is not fee
shifting even where payment derives from administrative charges imposed on
the regulated interests. Fees of public participants are not imposed exclusively
on the losing party in the same proceeding in the manner that characterizes
classical judicial fee shifting. The administrative forum is not the typical
adversarial legal arena, and the administrative decision is not a determination

142. 664 F.2d at 1230 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
143. See 16 U.S.C. § 803(e) (1974); Brief for Respondent on Rehearing En Banc at 9-13,
Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 559 F.2d 1227 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086
(1978). The Commission noted that "[i]n 1974 the total cost of administering Part 1 of the
[Federal Power] Act was approximately 4.3 million, of which 4.2 million was recovered through
annual charges." Id. at 12 n.7.
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of winners and losers, because the decisionmaking process is directed at
furthering the broad public interest. The policies that underlie the American
rule-not penalizing the exercise of legal rights, avoiding complex determinations of legal expenses, and preserving independent advocacy 144-are met
equally well in this context as they are in prototypal fee disbursement. Perhaps
most importantly, the perception that the source of money for compensation
derives from adversaries may itself be erroneous. Commercial entities pay
annual charges to the agency for the cost of administering the regulatory
scheme because Congress has so provided. Independently, the agency determines that it needs the input of public participants to make the best substantive decision and pays participant costs as a necessary regulatory expense.
There is no shifting of resources from loser to winner, but rather authorized
agency expenditure for one of the costs of administering the regulatory system.
C. Judicial Deference
Although, as a general principle, agencies and departments may possess
the power to spend appropriated money to implement objectives within their
statutory mandates, the extent to which a particular agency or department
may go in exercising such authority in specific instances will depend on the
wording of its enabling and appropriation statutes, the scope of the legislative
delegation, and any extra-statutory congressional expression. The different
considerations will be assigned weight of varying degrees of strength by the
Comptroller General, the agencies themselves, and individual members of
Congress, all of which should be considered by the courts addressing questions of implied reimbursement power. While the positions articulated by
legislative and administrative authorities will necessarily enter the judicial
calculus, determining the amount of deference that courts should accord to
these nonjudicial expressions raises controversial and complex issues. Analysis
of the interpretive roles of the legislative and administrative bodies, as well as
traditional concepts of judicial function and statutory construction, lead to
the conclusion that, except for specific statutory prescriptions or proscriptions, courts should not consider dispositive any of the nonjudicial expressions.
1. Opinions of the Comptroller General. Courts ruling on the question of
agency compensation power have accorded different weight to the participant
reimbursement opinions rendered by the Comptroller General. These determinations have been issued under statutory authority, providing that government officials "may apply for and the Comptroller General shall render his
decision upon any question involving a payment to be made by them or under
them, which decision, when rendered, shall govern the General Accounting
Office [GAO] in passing upon the account containing said disbursement." 145
Even prior to 1894, when this provision was passed as part of the Dockery Act
144. See supra text accompanying notes 131-37.
145. 31 u.s.c. § 74 (1976).
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reorganization of the federal auditing and accounting system, 146 government
comptrollers and auditors had performed the judge-like duty of statutory
construction. 147 The Attorney General subsequently confirmed that the
powers formerly exercised by the accounting officials were assumed by the
Comptroller General. 148 The courts have also stated that Comptroller opinions may necessarily be based on the interpretation and application of statutes.149 But while the Comptroller's determinations estop the General Accounting Office from subsequently challenging agency actions in conformance
therewith, and while some judges and the Attorney General have found that
these rulings bind the executive branch, 150 there is nearly universal agreement
that the Comptroller's opinions can be contested in the courts. 151 Thus,
claimants who are denied government payment pursuant to legal determinations of the Comptroller General may judicially challenge those rulings, 152 and
the courts will generally review the issues de novo. 153
Nondeferential review of the Comptroller's decisions comports with the
character and authority of the Comptroller's office. While Congress may have
designated the fiscal official its principal agent for determining whether federal expenditures comply with the language and purpose of its enactments, the
Comptroller's role in supervising executive and administrative spending
should not dictate how courts review the Comptroller's rulings. The Comptroller is not vested with administration of the particular statutes under which

146. Act of July 31, 1894, ch. 174, §§ 3-9, 28 Stat. 205-08, as amended, Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921, ch. 18, 42 Stat. 20.
147. See 26 Cong. Rec. 7483-84 (1894); see also Note, The Control Powers of the Comptrol·
!er General, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 1199, 1201 (1956).
148. 21 Op. Att'y Gen. 181, 182 (1895); accord 33 Op. Att'y Gen. 265, 267 (1922); 21 Op.
Att'y Gen. 178 (1895). But cf. Morgan, supra note 52, at 1303 n.78 (repeated discussion of
"judicial role" of Comptroller General in debates on the Act were all in context of salary and
tenure that official should have; beyond that the references were mere hyperbole).
149. See Brunswick v. Elliott, 103 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
150. See United States ex rel. Brookfield Constr. Co. v. Stewart, 234 F. Supp. 94, 100
(D.D.C.}, aff'd per curiam, 339 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1964); 33 Op. Att'y Gen. 265, 267 (1922); see
also Pettit v. United States, 488 F.2d 1026, 1031 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (GAO "decisions respecting money
claims are binding on the Executive branch of the Government" citing 31 U.S.C. §§ 44, 71, 74
(1970), even though GAO decision was not rendered pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 74 (1970)); United
States v. Standard Oil Co., 545 F.2d 624, 637-38 (9th Cir. 1976) (GAO certification of accounts
under 31 U.S.C. § 74 (1976) may estop agencies in subsequent litigation). But see Cibinic &
Lasken, supra note 52, at 360, arguing that the Dockery Act does not make the Comptroller's
opinions binding even on the executive branch, but that they are merely advisory.
151. See Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 559 F.2d 1227, 1239 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); id. at 1241 n.1 (Lumbard, J., dissenting); United States ex rel.
Brookfield Constr. Co. v. Stewart, 234 F. Supp. 94, 100 (D.D.C.), aff'd per curiam, 339 F.2d 753
(D.C. Cir. 1964); see also United States ex rel. Weinberger v. Equifax Inc., 557 F.2d 456, 463 n.6
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978); Morgan, supra note 52, at 1300-03.
152. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 545 F.2d 624, 638 (9th Cir. 1976); Wheelabrator
Corp. v. Chafee, 455 F.2d 1306, 1314 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Keco Indus. v. Laird, 318 F. Supp.
1361 (D.D.C. 1970); United States ex rel. Brookfield Constr. Co. v. Stewart, 234 F. Supp. 94, 100
(D.D.C.}, aff'd per curiam, 339 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
153. See Miguel v. McCarl, 291 U.S. 442 (1934); Leeds & Northrup Co. v. United States, 101
F. Supp. 999 (E.D. Pa. 1951); James Graham Mfg. Co. v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 715 (N.D.
Cal. 1950); United States v. Heller, 1 F. Supp. 1 (D. Md. 1932). See generally Morgan, supra note
52, at 1300-03.
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agencies seek to assert their spending power. 154 Comptroller rulings on disbursement therefore differ from statutory interpretation by agencies in the
fields of their substantive expertise, to which courts have traditionally acceded. Judges have been especially reluctant to defer to decisions that conflict
with constructions espoused by the agencies themselves. 155 Although courts
have acceded to determinations of the Comptroller rejecting challenges of
disappointed bidders on government contracts, 156 that deference is probably
dictated by concerns peculiar to the procurement context. The public interest
in a smoothly functioning process of government contracting 157 would be illserved by probing judicial review of the multitude of awards in federal bidding
contests. Moreover, in resolving disputes over bid protests, the Comptroller's
role is analogous to agencies interpreting their delegated authority so that the
Comptroller exercises the focused expertise that warrants judicial deference. 158
The Comptroller General's position on agency power to reimburse public
participants, like his rulings generally, cannot command much judicial deference. Nevertheless, to accord Comptroller opinions no more weight than
unofficial commentary would be to ignore the import of the supervisory and
advisory authority that Congress has actually vested in that official, as well as
the office's accumulated expertise. An intermediate course is, therefore, appropriate. As the Goyan district court observed, the Comptroller's "decisions
are entitled to more than just cursory consideration, particularly within a
context where it appears that his views have been brought to the attention of
Congress." 159 The quality of the specific analysis, the length of time and
consistency with which the Comptroller has maintained the position, and the
degree to which the ruling comports with the view of the agency itself are
variables that may also govern the strength accorded the Comptroller's opinions. While Comptroller decisions do not relieve courts of their responsibility
for de novo review, the rulings are a factor for judicial consideration in the
reimbursement context, as in other judicial determinations on government
expenditure.
2. Agency Interpretation. An agency's interpretation of its own power to
compensate seems to deserve no greater deference than the rulings of the
Comptroller General, even though the courts, with the exception of the Goyan

154. See Georgetown Note, supra note 99, at 941-42 and cases cited therein.
155. See Alaska S.S. Co. v. United States, 290 U.S. 256, 264 (1933).
156. See M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Wheelabrator
Corp. v. Chafee, 455 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1971); A.G. Schoonmaker Co. v. Resor, 445 F.2d 726
(D.C. Cir. 1971); Simpson Elec. Co. v. Seamans, 317 F. Supp. 684 (D.D.C. 1970). For an analysis
of these and other decisions in this line of authority, see Morgan, supra note 52, at 1339-44; Note,
Judicial Review and Remedies for the Unsuccessful Bidder on Federal Government Contracts, 47
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 496, 504-17 (1972).
157. See M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289, 1300, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See
generally Note, supra note 156, at 504-17.
158. Morgan observes that "[j]udicial rhetoric [in the bid-challenge cases may have] created
authority in the GAO that Congress had never chosen to provide." Morgan, supra note 52, at
1344.
159. Pacific Legal Found. v. Goyan, 500 F. Supp. 770, 776 (D. Md. 1980), rev'd, 664 F.2d
1221 (4th Cir. 1981).
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appeals panel, have appeared to defer to administrative constructions regarding reimbursement authority. The judiciary generally accords weight of varying degrees of strength to interpretation of legislation by the agency charged
with its administration. 160 The Supreme Court has said that an agency's
construction of legislation that it executes "should be followed unless there
are compelling indications that it is wrong." 161 However, the Court has also
declared that "administrative interpretations of statutory terms are given
important but not controlling significance" 162 and even that "a departmental
construction of its own enabling legislation ... is only one input in the
decisional equation." 163 Identifying the factors on which judicial deference
depends is speculative and often complex, and any of the accepted criteria can
be offset by others, articulated and unarticulated, in a particular case. As
Professor Davis has observed, "the degree of intensiveness of [judicial] review
is and probably should be for judicial discretion, and the exercise of discretion
must probably depend to some extent upon psychological considerations, as
well as upon formulas and theories." 164
Despite the uncertainty, courts and commentators have isolated certain
considerations that have purportedly guided judges in reviewing administrative interpretations. Principal variables are the comparative qualifications of
the agency and of the court to decide the particular question, the nature,
scope, and specific exercise of the power committed to the agency by the
legislative branch, and whether the issues involve enunciation of general
principles or application of legal concepts to particular facts. 165 Against these
criteria, the weight due an agency's construction of its own authority to
compensate participants in agency proceedings must be gauged.
The first factor requires deference where administrative interpretation
involves application of expertise that is the peculiar province of the agency.
Thus, judges generally will accord considerable weight to an agency construction relating to either scientific or technical expertise or that type of experience

160. See generally K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise§§ 5.03-.06, 30.01-.14 (1958); id.§
7:8-:15 (2d ed. 1979); id. § 7:13 -:14 (2d ed. Supp. 1982); Schopler, Supreme Court's View as to
Weight and Effect to be Given, on Subsequent Judicial Construction, to Prior Administrative
Construction of a Statute, 39 L. Ed. 2d 942 (1975).
161. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969); accord FCC v. WNCN
Listener's Guild, 450 U.S. 532, 598 (1981); Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125, 144 n.25 (1979); E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 55-57 (1977); New York State Dep't of Social
Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 421 (1973).
162. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424 (1977); see also United States v. National Ass'n
of Security Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 719 (1975).
163. Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 192 (1969). The Court exhibited even less deference when
it said that "[i]n order for an agency interpretation to be granted deference, it must be consistent
with the congressional purpose." Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 237 (1974) (citing Espinoza v.
Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973), and Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
(1969)). As one court has observed, "[T]his very nearly eliminates the 'deference' principle as
regards statutory construction altogether since if the agency's interpretation is found by a court to
be consistent with the congressional purpose, it presumably would be affirmed on that ground
without any need for deference." Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 49 (2d
Cir. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977).
164. K. bavis, supra note 160, § 30.08.
165. Id.
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that comes from resolving problems in the specialized area over which the
agency has jurisdiction. 166 However, "on ordinary problems of interpreting
statutes, the courts are the specialists" 167 and the "final authorities." 168 The
interpretation of administrative enabling and appropriations statutes to determine the existence of implied reimbursement authority clearly involves expertise of the latter kind, and the courts have no reason, on this account, to defer
to the agency position. 169
The second major consideration requires a determination as to the nature, scope, and specific exercise of the power granted the agency. Where the
disputed administrative interpretation involves an exercise of authority that
appears to expand the contours of an agency's statutory power, the judiciary
generally has not been deferential. In Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products,
Inc., 170 for example, the Supreme Court stated that the "determination of the
166. See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 568-69 (1980) (administrative agencies are simply better suited than courts to engage in an "empirical process that entails
investigation into consumer psychology and that presupposes broad experience with credit practices"); E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 54 (1977) (deference to "an
agency with great experience in the industry . . . given the task of applying . . . criteria to
particular business situations").
167. K. Davis, supra note 160, § 30.09; see Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544
F.2d 35, 49 (2d Cir. 1976) ("there is an impressive body of law sanctioning free substitution of
judicial for administrative judgment when the question involves the meaning of a statutory
term"), aff'd sub nom. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977); see also
Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 41 n.27 (1977) (presumed expertise of agency of limited
value when narrow legal issue is one peculiarly reserved for judicial resolution); Barlow v. Collins,
397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970); Hardin v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 14 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (little judicial deference to agency where dispute relates to meaning of statutory term,
and controversy must ultimately be resolved, not on the basis of matters within the special
competence of the agency, but by judicial application of canons of statutory construction);
National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (since statutory
construction is the "sort of question [that] calls largely for the exercise of historical analysis and
logical and analogical reasoning, it is the everyday staple of judges as well as agencies"), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974); Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 239,
264-72 (1955).
168. Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 102 S. Ct. 38,
42 (1981); accord FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1973); Wilderness Soc'y v.
Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 864 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973).
169. It is possible to argue that courts should defer to agency determinations respecting
reimbursement, because the decision to compensate involves questions that agencies are more
competent to answer than courts. For example, agencies are better qualified to determine the
quantity, quality, and costs of public participation in its proceedings, whether increased public
participation might improve the quality of agency decisionmaking, and how best to allocate
agency resources. However, this type of distinction-in essence one pertaining to "procedural"
expertise-does not find expression in the case law. Moreover, resolution of the issue of agency
reimbursement authority calls for a threshold determination that involves primarily if not exclusively questions of statutory interpretation.
170. 322 U.S. 607 (1944). The Addison decision voided a regulation promulgated by the
Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor pursuant to an erroneously perceived
implicit delegation of authority. The Court noted that Congress had made a specific grant of
power to the agency without substantive line-drawing authority, and that the language of the
relevant statute precluded administrative construction that would enlarge the delegated power.
There are, however, some statutory schemes in which Congress has delegated to agencies the
authority to make substantive determinations within circumscribed subject matter areas. Under
these circumstances, the judiciary has accorded substantial deference to an agency's interpretations of its authority. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm.,
102 S. Ct. 38 (1981); Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973).
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extent of authority given to a delegated agency by Congress is not left for the
decision of him in whom authority is vested." 171 This is consistent with the
accepted dichotomy between agency rules that are legislative and those that
are interpretive. 172 As the Court explained recently in Batterton v. Francis, 113
legislative regulations are issued by agencies when Congress has entrusted
them with "primary responsibility for interpreting the statutory term." 174
"Such rules have the force and effect of law .... By way of contrast, a court
is not required to give effect to an interpretive regulation." 175 In the latter
instance, the courts may accord agency constructions varying degrees of
deference, even substituting judicial judgment for that of the administrative
body. Because the exercise of implied funding authority rests on a determination respecting the contours of an agency's delegated power, the agency
cannot, in the first instance, determine the propriety of that exercise. Moreover, if Congress has not specifically provided an agency with substantive
authority to effectuate a reimbursement program, the agency's rulemaking in
the area must be regarded as fundamentally interpretive. Under either perspective, little deference is due the agency determination.

171. 322 U.S. at 616; accord East Tex. Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Frozen Food Express,
351 U.S. 49, 54 (1956); Social Security Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369 (1946); Hi-Craft
Clothing v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1981); Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc. v. CAB, 298 F.2d 430,
433 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 885 (1962); Florida Citrus Exch. v. Folsom, 246 F.2d 850,
857 (5th Cir. 1957), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Fleming v. Florida Citrus Exch., 358 U.S.
153 (1958); Robinson v. Vollert, 411 F. Supp. 461, 475 (S.D. Tex. 1976); Stark v. Brannan, 82 F.
Supp. 615, 618 (D.D.C. 1949), aff'd, 185 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd, 342 U.S. 451 (1952);
see also FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,
440 U.S. 490 (1979). See generally CAB v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 367 U.S. 316, 325, 334 (1961);
United States v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 329 U.S. 424 (1947).
In instances in which courts have deferred to administrative statutory construction, Congress
appears to have placed its imprimatur on the agency's interpretation. See, e.g., Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381-82 (1969); Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. FPC, 420
U.S. 395, 410-11 (1975); see also Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign
Comm., 102 S. Ct. 38, 45 (1981).
172. K. Davis, supra note 160, § 30.10.
173. 432 U.S. 416 (1977). In Batterton, the Court confirmed the unemployment eligibility
standards promulgated by the Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare pursuant to a specific
delegation under the Social Security Act. By contrast, in Social Security Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S.
358 (1946), the Court rejected the Social Security Board's construction of the Act that would have
excluded backpay from the statutory definition of wages. The Court observed that Congress had
not delegated to the Board the determination of what constituted wages.
174. Batterton, 432 U.S. at 425. The question is not whether substantive power is given but
whether substantive power to draw lines is given. For example, if Congress authorizes an agency
to make such reimbursements as will enable it to receive all information necessary for dccisionmaking, the agency is provided primary reponsibility to decide when and how to compensate
participants, and the power is legislative. But, if Congress authorizes an agency to take whatever
actions, or make whatever expenditures, are necessary to implement the statute, the agency is not
given primary responsibility to decide whether reimbursement is necessary to implement the
statute, and the power is therefore interpretive. See also K. Davis, supra note 160, at §§ 7:8,
29.00-7 (2d ed. 1982 Supp.).
175. 432 U.S. at 425 n.9 (citing U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General's Manual on the
Administrative Procedure Act 30 n.3 (1947)); accord, Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,
301-03 (1979); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976). The classic statement of
the effect to be given interpretive rules appears in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944).
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Third, resolution of the statutory issue of agency compensation power
involves articulation of general concepts, rather than application of rules of
law to particular facts or circumstances. The threshold determination of the
existence of funding authority is a generic one, the consequences of which
extend to a broad range of rulemaking and adjudicatory activities. This type
of judgment is also primarily the province of the courts, 176 and they need not,
therefore, accede to agency views.
Other factors relevant to judicial deference to administrative interpretations add little to the analysis. The funding programs were neither established
contemporaneously with enactment of the statutory clauses on which they are
premised, 177 nor have they attained the stature of longstanding, continuous,
and consistent agency practices that the judiciary has been hesitant to disturb.178 Moreover, it is difficult to find de facto ratification of the agency
initiatives 179 in Congress's ambiguous treatment of reimbursement. While
courts have acceded to administrative constructions when the agency has a
history of accurate interpretation of its power and substantial experience in
the administration of its statute, 180 these factors alone are probably insufficient to bind the judiciary in the novel area of participant compensation.
Unless a court concludes that Congress intended that an agency have
authority to decide whether participant funding was within its substantive
grant of power, the agency's determination cannot command judicial deference. The agency interpretations may warrant even less consideration than
those of the Comptroller General, to whom Congress has explicitly granted a
measure of interpretive authority. While the administrative position on reimbursement should not be ignored, it is only one piece of informed input
among many that courts may consult in analyzing agency power to compensate.181

176. K. Davis, supra note 160, at§ 30.11.
177. See Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 272-73 (1981); EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods
Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 600 n.17 (1981); National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440
U.S. 472, 477 (1979); Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach.
Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 408 (1961); Schopler, supra note 160, at 965-66.
178. See Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979); Board of Governors v. First
Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U.S. 234, 248 (1978); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443,
450 (1978); United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 719 (1975);
Schopler, supra note 160, at 966-69.
179. See Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 74 (1974); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 380-82 (1969); Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach.
Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1961); National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FrC, 482 F.2d 672,
695-97 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
180. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 102 S. Ct.
38, 44-45 (1981); Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1976),
aff'd sub nom. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977); Thompson v.
Clifford, 408 F.2d 154, 167 (D.C. Cir. 1968); K. Davis, supra note 160, at§ 30.08.
181. Of course, enactment of the Bumpers Amendment in most of the forms proposed to
date would require that courts accord even less deference to an agency's interpretation of its own
implied reimbursement authority. See generally O'Reilly, Deference Makes a Difference: A Study
of Impacts of the Bumpers Judicial Review Amendment, 49 U. Cin. L. Rev. 739 (1980); Woodward & Levin, In Defense of Deference: Judicial Review of Agency Action, 31 Ad. L. Rev. 329
(1979).
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3. Congressional Expression. With little persuasive judicial precedent and
few authoritative sources of statutory construction, courts understandably
must ascertain whether anything can be gleaned from the legislative activity
relating to participant funding. Congress has shown considerable interest in
agency reimbursement and has spoken to the issue in substantive and appropriations enactments, in committee reports and floor debates, and in legislative proposals. 182 The inferences to be drawn from these sources vary, because Congress has not given clear and comprehensive consideration to
compensation.
The interpretive task of the courts, bridging legislative prerogative and
judicial decision, is difficult. It should not be complicated, however, by
confusing the roles of court, legislature, and administrative agency. Chief
Judge Kaufman, in the Greene County concurring opinion, urged that "[t]he
decision whether to expend public funds to advance an essentially private
point of view by its very nature is political, and in a democracy, more
appropriately made by the elected representatives of the people" and added
that selection among potential applicants for reimbursement presents "choices
[that] are particularly unamenable to judicial structuring." 183 These admonitions are misplaced. The court's function in the compensation controversy
involves neither the usurpation of legislative prerogative nor the administrative exercise of distributional choice. 184 The judicial task is to make a threshold determination about the existence of agency funding authority by performing the traditional duty of statutory interpretation.
In pursuing this statutory analysis, judges have indicated that Congress's
failure to adopt measures granting all agencies reimbursement power demonstrates that such authority does not exist absent specific legislative directive.185 However, the Supreme Court has long held that reliable conclusions
as to the intent of Congress cannot be drawn from its failure to enact legislation.186 In the particular context of the compensation controversy, proposals
providing for funding on a government-wide basis may have been introduced
and considered to eliminate doubt, to afford explicit guidance for the institution of reimbursement programs, to minimize duplication through uniform-

182. See supra notes 67-97 and accompanying text.
183. Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 559 F.2d 1227, 1240 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
184. See id. at 1241, 1243 n.6 (Lumbard, J., dissenting) ("It would be the administrative
agency, and not the court, which in the first instance would determine whether intervenors make a
substantial enough contribution to the administrative process to merit a fee award.").
185. See id. at 1239-40; Pacific Legal Found. v. Goyan, 664 F.2d 1221, 1225-26 (4th Cir.
1981).
186. See American Trucking Ass'n v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 387 U.S. 397 (1967); United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 560-61 (1944); Helvering v. Hallock,
309 U.S. 106, 119, 121 (1940). The Court has said that it "may often be shaky business to
attribute significance to the inaction of Congress." Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International
Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 409 (1961); see also United States v.
Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554 n.10 (1979).
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ity, to encourage more agencies to initiate funding efforts 187 or for any
number of other reasons. 188
The more troubling question is why Congress would have specifically
empowered a few agencies to compensate if it believed that every agency
already possessed funding authority . 189 An answer is provided in National
Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 190 in which the FTC sought broadly to
exercise substantive rulemaking power specifically granted in some, but not
all, of the statutes administered by the Commission. The District of Columbia
Circuit held that the FTC had broad rulemaking authority. It speculated that
Congress may have enacted legislation providing the specific grants of rulemaking power out of "uncertainty, understandable caution, and a desire to
avoid litigation." 191 Because all of the specific reimbursement authorizations, except that of the State Department, were included in newly passed
agency-specific measures for regulating particular substantive areas, 192 it
could be inferred that enactment of these prescriptions was simply a matter of
legislative convenience. Congress also may have deemed compensated public
participation so indispensable to accomplishment of particular agencies' mandates as to obviate the need for its specific provision. 193
Thus, it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw defensible inferences from
legislative failure to adopt general funding proposals and congressional provision for reimbursement by a few agencies. Congress's rejection of substantive
measures, both authorizing and prohibiting participant compensation by all
agencies, as well as its specific authorization of funding by some agencies and
its contrary directives in the appropriations process to others, indicates that
the legislature has not spoken definitively to the issue of a general administrative power of participant reimbursement.
Analysis of agency funding authority must therefore focus on particular
administrative bodies. Even here, Congress has not unequivocally addressed
the fundamental question whether specific agencies possess power to compen-

187. See44 Fed. Reg. 59,174, 59,178 (1979); accord Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Heimann,
613 F.2d 1164, 1169 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 823 (1980).
188. For example, the congressional activity may have been a response to the Comptroller
General's recommendation that legislative guidance on funding be provided the agencies. See
Letter from R.F. Keller to NRC, supra note 54. Some of these reasons are articulated by Judge
Murnaghan in the dissenting opinion in Goyan, 664 F.2d at 1227.
189. The difficulty is raised only in Goyan and not addressed very explicitly there. See
Pacific Legal Found. v. Goyan, 664 F.2d 1221, 1225-26 (4th Cir. 1981).
190. 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
191. Id. at 696. See also In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 653 F.2d
514, 523-24 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
192. These are narrow measures, such as the Toxic Substances Control Act or the Magnuson-Moss legislation, as opposed to generic regulatory reform legislation. Compare supra notes 69
& 70 with S. 1080, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
193. See Pacific Legal Found. v. Goyan, 664 F.2d 1221, 1229 (4th Cir. 1981) (Murnaghan,
J., dissenting). Judge Murnaghan criticizes the majority's implicit reliance on the maxim expressio
unius est exclusio alterius and makes a strong policy argument for legislating by implication. It
may also be argued that if Congress believed agencies lack authority, it would have been
unnecessary to instruct them not to use appropriated money for funding.
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sate as a component of their delegated authority .194 Where the legislature has
sought to bar participant reimbursement, it has always relied upon the appropriations process. When Congress indicates in the body of an appropriations
statute that appropriated funds are not to be used for certain purposes,
agencies are bound by the legislative restriction although it violates Congress's
own rules against effecting substantive change in existing legislation through
appropriations measures. 195 The judiciary has honored the constraints imposed in fiscal statutes even when they contravene programs specifically authorized in substantive legislation; thus, there can be little question of the
effect of these limitations on activity undertaken pursuant to powers that are
less specific.
The value to be assigned congressional expression in legislative history,
however, can be problematic. Committee reports and floor debates that accompany substantive measures-traditional sources for statutory construction-command judicial attention, although they do not have the prescriptive
character of the enactments themselves. Congress, however, has instructed a
194. All of the statutory prohibitions simply state, without articulating any rationale, that no
funds appropriated are to be spent on participant reimbursement. Where reasons for the congressional action are provided in the accompanying legislative history, a lack of agency power to
compensate is generally not one of those expressly articulated. Even when reimbursement authority is explicitly mentioned, other considerations are as well, so that it is simply not possible to
attribute the legislative action exclusively to Congress's view on the issue of compensation power.
The proscription imposed upon reimbursement in the appropriations act governing HUD and
related agencies appears more than any other prohibition to have been based on congressional
belief that the agencies lacked authority. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. The issue of
agency power, however, was only one of several mentioned during the debate on the Senate floor
in which the amendment proscribing compensation was adopted. See 126 Cong. Rec. 13,084-86
(1980).
195.
According to its own rules, Congress is not supposed to use appropriations measures as
vehicles for the amendment of general laws, including revision of expenditure authorization. In general, the doctrine disfavoring repeals by implications is said to apply "with
full vigor" when the subsequent law is an appropriations measure. Where Congress

chooses to do so, however, we are bound to follow Congress's last word on the matter
even in an appropriations law.
City of Los Angeles v. Adams, 556 F.2d 40, 48-49 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted); accord United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554 (1940); Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591
F.2d 121 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 952 (1979); Zbaraz v. Quern, 596 F.2d 196 (7th Cir.
1979), cert. denied 448 U.S. 907 (1980). See generally Fisher, The Authorization-Appropriation
Process in Congress: Formal Rules and Informal Practices, 29 Cath. U.L. Rev. 51, 86-87 (1979),
and cases cited therein. Although rule 16.4 of the Standing Rules of the Senate provides that no
amendment that proposes general legislation shall be attached to any general appropriation bill,
and the House has a similar provision in House rule XXI (2) (both are reproduced in City of Los
Angeles v. Adams, 556 F.2d 40, 48 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1977)), Congress has, since the nineteenth
century, followed the general practice of using appropriations measures to set policy. See Fisher,
supra, at 85. Moreover, Congress has for many years relied upon the funding process to instruct
agencies that they are not to use appropriated money for purposes authorized by substantive
statutes. See the statutory provision cited in the classic case of United States v. Dickerson, 310
U.S. 554 (1940). But see Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978) ("When voting
on appropriations measures, legislators are entitled to operate under the assumption that the
funds will be devoted to purposes which are lawful and not for any purpose forbidden."). The
legislature has twice used appropriations measures to proscribe expenditure of funds for participant compensation, after specifically empowering agencies to spend for such purposes, see supra
notes 70 & 82' (EPA) and 74 & 75 (FERC) and accompanying text.
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number of agencies in legislative materials that attend appropriations acts that
they are not to pay citizen participants. These directives are entitled to considerably less weight than those that accompany substantive statutes. 196 Indeed,
the Comptroller General "has frequently expressed the view that expressions
of intent as to spending, contained ... in appropriations committee reports,
are not legally binding" 197 unless they also appear in actual legislation, and in
particular has advised agencies that they can compensate public participants
despite restrictions included in these reports. The Supreme Court itself has
discounted, albeit with qualifications, the value of these statements of appropriations committees. 198 The weight assigned should depend on the clarity
and specificity with which the congressional expressions address the scope of
agency reimbursement powers-as contrasted with assertions that speak more
generally to the use of appropriated money-and the extent to which they
would nullify the letter or spirit of existing legislation. 199 Thus far, proscriptions upon participant compensation imposed in the appropriations process
have not spoken in terms of agency authority and, therefore, should be
accorded little weight against a finding that funding power is consistent with
agency function and substantive legislative mandate.
Absent specific statutory directive, both general and agency-focused congressional expressions do not provide dispositive guidance for courts. The
legislative materials are open to multiple interpretations, and, like the Comptroller General's opinions and the agency constructions, are elements of limited value among all of the factors available for consideration. Rather than
engage in overly mechanical statutory analysis that draws on diffuse, ambiguous, and even contradictory legislative sources, it is preferable to recognize the
validity of the general implied powers doctrine as applied to the specific
reimbursement concept and inquire whether participant funding is consistent
with agency statutory mandates. Where citizen compensation serves to improve the quality of administrative decisionmaking and is in harmony with the
congressionally defined character and operation of an administrative body,
the existence of reimbursement authority should be recognized.
IV. THE

REIMBURSEMENT EXPERIENCE

Perhaps the most persuasive reason for finding compensated public participation inherently consistent with administrative mandate is the perform196. See National Small Shipments Traffic Conf., Inc. v. CAB, 618 F.2d 819, 828 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
197. Decision of the Comptroller General, supra note 60, at 5-6.
198. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 191 (1978); see also Rural Electrification
Admin. v. Central Louisiana Elec. Co., 354 F.2d 859, 865 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 815
(1966) ("demands of Congressional [appropriations] Committees do not have the force of law").
199. These factors are drawn from recent decisions treating the specific doctrine of repeal by
implication. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190-92 (1978); Preterm, Inc. v.
Dukakis, 591F.2d121 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 952 (1979). For further discussion of
this doctrine, see Fisher, supra note 195, at 86-87. The factors also are employed in cases in which
courts undertake general statutory interpretation. See, e.g., National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v.
FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
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ance of reimbursement programs to date. With approximately ten federal
agencies exercising specific or implied authority to fund public involvement in
administrative proceedings, the potential for properly conceived and executed
compensation programs to enhance the administrative process is no longer
mere speculation. The documented experience of these agencies with the
reimbursement concept illustrates a variety of ways in which the funded
participant can contribute to high quality and cost-effective decisionmaking.
This experience should not only persuade Congress to eliminate appropriations restraints and to sanction a broader range of programs but also convince
courts that the reimbursement initiatives instituted by agencies themselves are
legitimate instruments of administrative function.
Rigorous evaluation of the effect that funded participation has had on
agency decisionmaking is difficult, 200 and not surprisingly a comprehensive
impact study has yet to be undertaken. 201 Problems of definition 202 and

200. See Rosener, Citizen Participation: Can We Measure Its Effectiveness?, 38 Pub. Ad.
Rev. 457 (1978); Rosenbaum, Policy Impacts, National Symposium on Citizen Participation (Feb.
4, 1980), in Citizen Participation: Models and Methods of Evaluation 30 (N. Rosenbaum ed.
1980) (published by Center for Responsive Governance) (on file in the offices of the Columbia
Law Review); B. Boyer, Compensating Public Participants in Administrative Rulemaking: The
Federal Trade Commission Experience 97 (June 1980). The Boyer study is a thorough report,
prepared under the auspices of the Administrative Conference, on activity relating to participant
compensation at the FTC from 1976 until 1979. See generally 45 Fed. Reg. 2307 (1980). There also
is a condensed version of the report. See Boyer, Funding Public Participation in Agency Proceedings: The Federal Trade Commission Experience, 70 Geo. L.J. 51 (1981).
201. Even in the FTC study undertaken by Professor Boyer, supra note 200, the efficacy of
compensation was evaluated comprehensively for only one proceeding. Although several intraagency analyses have been performed, either on an agency's own initiative or at the behest of
Congress, see, e.g., Department of Transportation Demonstration Program to Provide Financial
Assistance to Participants in Administrative Proceedings: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's Evaluations and Recommendations (1977) [hereinafter cited as NHTSA Study) (on
file in the offices of the Columbia Law Review); Robards, Civil Aeronautics Board Compensated
Public Participation Program Evaluation (Sept. 15, 1980) [hereinafter cited as CAB Study) (on
file in the offices of the Columbia Law Review), these were apparently intended to convince
Congress of the value of compensated involvement and are not objective studies. A few extraagency studies of specific proceedings have been undertaken. See, e.g., Noble, Evaluation of
Energy Policy Task Force Role in DOE Hearings (May 1979) (unpublished paper prepared for
Professor Roy Schotland, Georgetown University Law Center) (on file in the offices of the
Columbia Law Review); Stellato & Wright, An Evaluation of Agency Programs for the Reimbursement of Participants in Rulemaking Proceedings (May 1981) (same). There is also much
congressional testimony from both government and private-sector proponents and opponents of
reimbursed participation. But, in many administrative proceedings in which funded activity has
occurred no formal evaluation appears to have been conducted.
202. Defining the concept of efficacy, for example, presents numerous difficulties. One
criterion might be the notion of "winning," the focus being on how closely the decision adopted
by the agency resembled the position of those reimbursed. Yet, even this "seemingly straightforward inquiry presents some practical difficulties," such as ascertaining precisely the positions of
paid participants and whether those positions were assumed for tactical reasons. See B. Boyer,
supra note 200, at 133-34. A second, more moderate approach and the one employed in this
Article, is to ask whether the funded citizen involvement improved the quality of agency decisionmaking. For example, did the contribution force the decisionmakers to examine the issues
presented in a constructive manner, even if the input provided was ultimately rejected? A third
approach might be to ask whether the compensated participation was of high quality, even if it
had no effect on the substantive determination. "This approach, however, moves the inquiry even
farther away from basically objective measures to subjective assessment of the quality of representation and the substantive validity of the positions advocated." Id. at 136.
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measurement, 203 as well as financial constraints, 204 have impeded efforts to
analyze the performance of reimbursement programs and to gauge their efficacy against alternatives. Nevertheless, both objective data and opinions of
knowledgeable observers 205 suggest that compensated involvement has had
positive, identifiable impact on the decisional process. While the pilot programs have revealed inefficiencies and operational difficulties, many problems
have proven tractable and those that seem to inhere in the funding mechanism
do not eclipse the beneficial effects of reimbursement on decisionmaking.
A. The Benefits of Participant Reimbursement

The salutary effects of funded involvement have been manifested in
successive phases of the decisional process, where compensated participants
have defined and sharpened the issues, interests, and options with which the
agencies must contend, supplied materials and insights that otherwise might
not have reached the agencies, assisted the agencies in evaluating the information and arguments presented, and contributed to the reasoned and confident
formulation of administrative determinations.
1. Setting the Decisional Framework. Officials in a number of agencies
have commented broadly on the enhanced perspectives provided by funded
participants. One agency found that its financial assistance program had
"provid[ed] decisionmakers with a wider understanding of the social, economic, environmental, political, and intellectual interests involved in their
203. "[E]ven a perfect match between [a funded] group's position and the final [decision]
would not necessarily mean that the group's efforts had caused the agency to adopt that approach." B. Boyer, supra note 200, at 134. For example, the ultimate administrative determination might be attributable to the advocacy of other participants or to factors unrelated to the
record made, such as the "policy preferences of the individual [decisionmakers] and the general
political climate of the times." Id. at 134-35. For further discussion of the difficulties entailed in
measuring the cause-effect relationship, see id. at 134-36; Rosenbaum, supra note 200, at 46-47.
204. There appear to be no reliable figures on cost. Professor Boyer estimated that the cost
of his study "ran well into six figures" but was unable to separate the expense of assessing
impacts from the cost of analyzing program administration. Telephone Interviews with Barry B.
Boyer (Nov. 24, 1981) and Michael Bowers of the Administrative Conference of the United States
(Dec. 9, 1981). By contrast, the person who evaluated the CAB program estimated that the study
cost only $700. Telephone interview with Glen Robards, Jr., Presidential Management Intern,
CAB Dec. 1, 1981. The CAB study, however, did not approach the breadth and complexity of
Professor Boyer's analysis of the FTC program. For discussion of other obstacles to rigorous
evaluation of participant funding programs, see Rosenbaum, supra note 200; Rosener, supra note
200, at 458-59.
205. In drawing the conclusions reached in this Article the author surveyed the experiences
of the ten agencies that have engaged in participant funding. The agencies have reimbursed citizen
participants in approximately 100 proceedings to perform a broad range of tasks. The available
studies on participant funding, particularly those that were deemed not to be completely trustworthy, were supplemented with interviews of persons involved in the agency proceedings-presiding
officers, agency staff, reimbursed participants, and regulated parties-keeping in mind Professor
Boyer's observations that the "opinions of informed observers may be the best available information in this area," B. Boyer, supra note 200, at 133, and that interviews generally are more
valuable than examination of the record. Telephone interview with Barry B. Boyer, Nov. 24,
1981. An attempt also was made to assess funded involvement in proceedings that had not been
evaluated, subject to resource constraints. Some of the general conclusions drawn throughout this
section reflect confidential material, though all of the specific information may be gleaned from
the cited sources.
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decisions," 206 while the head of the FTC declared that citizen reimbursement
"brought to the Commission table diverse, unique, and important perspectives and interests which enriched [the Commission's] deliberations and contributed substantially to the final shape of the [pending] rule.'' 207 Examples
of interests whose involvement was made possible by public funding include a
trade association that provided otherwise unavailable perspectives in FTC
mobile home hearings, 208 and the National Council of Senior Citizens, which
offered the views and experiences of its members in Commission proceedings
on hearing aid marketing and regulation. 209 By thus enabling decisionmakers
to hear directly from a greater number of affected interests, participant
funding has afforded agencies greater appreciation of the consequences of
their choices.
Reimbursed entities have also provided agencies with fresh legal insights,
both substantive and procedural, that have affected ultimate decisions. The
contribution of a compensated participant gave content to a statutory reasonableness standard and guided HUD in setting utility fee schedules for occupants of public housing. 210 In Department of Transportation hearings on fuel
economy standards, a funded group suggested that the agency exercise its
subpoena power to insure receipt of important information from automobile
manufacturers. 211 Moreover, through both legal and factual argument, compensated parties have focused issues and sharpened analysis, thus improving
the decisional process. 212
206. NHTSA Study, supra note 201, at 1.
207. S. 104 Hearings, supra note 94, at 197 (statement of FTC Chairman Collier). Chairman
Collier's successor has made similar comments: "The decisionmaking process was enormously
enriched by the diversity of views that could never have been obtained without Magnuson-Moss
funding." Id. (statement of FTC Chairman Pertschuk); see also Regulatory Reform Legislation:
Hearings on S. 262, S. 755, S. 455, & S. 93 Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 378 (1979) (statement of FTC Chairman Pertschuk) [hereinafter
cited as S. 262 Hearings]; 1 C.F.R. § 305.80-1 (1981) (Administrative Conference recommendation that the FTC reimbursement program be continued without substantial modification).
208. See Authorizations for the FTC: Hearings on S. 1020 Before the Subcomm. for
Consumers of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 6 (1979) (statement of FTC Chairman Pertschuk) [hereinafter cited as S. 1020 Hearings].
The group provided insights on how the mobile home warranty system worked in practice, with
perspectives that neither consumer groups nor manufacturers could supply. See generally 40 Fed.
Reg. 23,334 (1975); 44 Fed. Reg. 53,538 (1979).
209. See H.R. 3361 Hearings, supra note 93, at 500 (statement of FTC Chairman Collier);
H.R. Rep. No. 134, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (1976). Funding of the senior citizen group in the
hearing aid proceeding is documented in B. Boyer, supra note 200, at app. A. See generally 40
Fed. Reg. 26,646 (1975); 42 Fed. Reg. 43,867 (1977).
210. See S. 104 Hearings, supra note 94, at 169 (statement of Mass. Lieutenant Governor
Thomas O'Neill III). The party was able to persuade HUD that the Department's formulas would
impose an excessive burden on public housing tenants, and as a result, HUD increased utility
charges by only five percent as opposed to the thirty-five percent increase originally contemplated.
211. NHTSA Study, supra note 201, at 10. See generally 49 C.F.R. Pt. 531 (1981) (NHTSA).
212.
[T]here's not been an occasion in which they didn't sharpen the analysis ....
[T]hey did confuse me with the facts, which was a good thing. And they confused me
with analysis. But out of that confusion, out of that conflict, out of this adversary
system it seems we get more informed decisionmaking.
S. 1020 Hearings, supra note 208, at 14-15 (statement of FTC Commissioner Pitofsky); see also
id. at 7 (statement of FTC Chairman Pertschuk).
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2. Supplying Information. Financially assisted participants have provided
agencies with information that had not previously reached them. For example,
at the urging of a reimbursed group the BPA included an exemption in its
regulation governing polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB's) for the chemical's use
in microscopy. The agency had not previously been aware that PCB's were
employed in this manner. 213 The same funded group, participating in proceedings on materials that include asbestos, informed the CPSC of an extremely hazardous, asbestos-containing product commercially available to
artists. 214 More generally, agency officials have testified that compensated
participants "have developed information, proposed evidence and conducted
surveys ... which have added materially to the quality of the [administrative
records]," 215 and have assisted decisionmakers in more effectively managing
those records. 216
3. Suggesting Alternative Methodology and Analysis. In a number of
instances, reimbursed parties have proposed superior methods of testing and
evaluation or have exposed deficiencies in the reasoning of agencies or other
entities. A funded participant in the NHTSA proceeding involving use of
vehicle child restraints suggested a testing technique not considered by the
agency staff. 217 A compensated individual challenged the validity of scientific
studies submitted to the FDA in support of a petition for approval of the food
additive aspartame. The Board of Public Inquiry serving as the initial agency
decisionmaker agreed that the submitted data did not eliminate the possibility
that the additive caused tumors in laboratory animals, and that the evidence

213. See Office of Toxic Substances, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, PCB Public
Participation Pilot Summary (1978) [hereinafter cited as EPA Study] (on file in the offices of the
Columbia Law Review); 40 C.F.R. § 761.31(k) (1981). The regulation as initially proposed
appears at 43 Fed. Reg. 24,802 (1978). See generally Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 636 F.
2d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
214. Memorandum: Funding Under 1980 Public Participation Program (not including§ 7) 2
(1980) [hereinafter cited as CPSC Study] (on file in the offices of the Columbia Law Review). But
see Stellato & Wright, supra note 201, at 21 ("[p]erhaps the only real reliance on [the compensated
group's] information by CPSC [was] exhibited by the placement of 'kilns' on the list of products
involved in the CPSC order for information").
Novel input also appears to have been generated in the FfC's food advertising rulemaking.
Staff attorneys in that proceeding observed that a funded entity "submitted an impressive written
analysis of the rule's energy and calorie sections presenting evidence ... not considered by the
staff." H.R. 3361 Hearings, supra note 93, at 500 (statement of FfC Chairman Collier); cf. 1
C.F.R. § 305.79-5 (1981) (reimbursement can broaden sources of information presented in
proceedings). See generally 40 Fed. Reg. 23,086 (1975); 43 Fed. Reg. 11,834 (1978).
215. S. 270 Hearings, supra note 18, at 7 (statement of James DeLong, Assistant Director,
FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection). In interviews with Professor Boyer, the FfC "Commissioners pointed out some of the benefits they saw from the public participation program: it ...
gave the Commissioners more confidence that they were deciding on the basis of a complete
record." B. Boyer, supra note 200, at 144; see also S. 104 Hearings, supra note 94, at 177, 197
(statements of NHTSA Administrator Claybrook).
216. See Hearings on S. 1020, supra note 208, at 28 (statement of FrC Commissioner
Clanton); id. at 7 (statement ofFfC Chairman Pertschuk); S. 104 Hearings, supra note 94, at 197
(same); Hearings on S. 262, supra note 207, at 401 (same).
217. See generally 44 Fed. Reg. 72,131 (1979).
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suggested that aspartame might induce tumors. 218 A reimbursed participant
in Department of Energy hearings on heating oil deregulation provided the
most accurate model depicting refinery overcharges, 219 improved on agency
measurement techniques by employing alternative base data, 220 and persuaded
the decisionmaker that a Justice Department analysis suggesting the existence
of industry competition was erroneous. 221
4. Proposing Courses of Action and Facilitating Decisions. Funded entities have also suggested alternative, less onerous, and occasionally novel, ways
to achieve administrative objectives. For example, at the urging of compensated participants, the CPSC decided to devise mandatory safety standards
for unvented gas space heaters, rather than ban the devices as initially contemplated.222 In FTC proceedings on consumer protection in the purchase of
used cars, the agency staff had originally proposed a very detailed set of
disclosures. A reimbursed group, however, conducted a survey that demonstrated consumer preference for simple disclosures, and the staff revised its
recommendations to incorporate the group's suggestions. 223 An unusual, but
effective course of action was proposed by a funded individual in CPSC
hearings on home insulation materials. The participant, who had become ill
after urea-formaldehyde foam was installed in his home, reported that physicians were initially unable to diagnose his condition and urged that the Commission bring appropriate diagnostic information to the attention of the
medical community. 224 Acting on this advice, the agency staff contacted the
Journal of the American Medical Association, which subsequently published
an article on the formaldehyde-associated disorder. 225
218. See 46 Fed. Reg. 38,285, 38,286 (1981). For documentation of the participant funding,
see Smith, Preliminary Assessment of the FDA's Pilot Public Reimbursement Program§ 5 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as FDA Study] (on file in the offices of the Columbia Law Review). The FDA
Commissioner who was the final decisionmaker observed that in the "hearing before the Public
Board of Inquiry, the first of its kind to be convened, the scientific issues presented •.• were
intellectually complex and carried wide ranging public health ramifications" and that the "Board
performed admirably in maintaining a judicial decorum and in crystalizing its views of the issues
in its Initial Decision." Id. at 38,289. Nonetheless, the Commissioner disagreed with the Board in
what can be fairly characterized as a "close" decision.
219. Decision and Recommendations No. 2 (Home) Heating Oil, Department of Energy,
Office of Hearings and Appeals 84 (Nov. 29, 1978) [hereinafter cited as OHA Decision] (on file in
the offices of the Columbia Law Review). DOE apparently never adopted the OHA recommenda·
tions. For comprehensive analysis of the OHA proceedings, see Noble, supra note 201.
220. OHA Decision, supra note 219, at 81. In the NHTSA proceeding on fuel economy
standards, a reimbursed participant used "different input asumptions" to introduce "important
challenges to the assumptions made by the Model" being employed. NHTSA Study, supra note
201, at 11.
221. OHA Decision, supra note 219, at 126. OHA also relied upon the policy reasons
enunciated by a witness for the compensated organization in deciding that "anti-trust remedies
[were] not likely to be successful in resolving competitive problems in the refining industry." Id.
at 132.
222. CPSC Study, supra note 214, at 1. See generally 45 Fed. Reg. 61,880, 61,882 (1980).
223. S. 104 Hearings, supra note 94, at 228 (statement of Nancy Drabble). See generally 46
Fed. Reg. 41,328 (1981). Congress subsequently vetoed these regulations, 127 Cong. Rec.
S5371-402 (daily ed. May 18, 1982); H.2856-83 (daily ed. May 26, 1982).
224. CPSC Study, supra note 214, at 1. As a result of the witness's testimony, CPSC "staff
is preparing general information on formaldehyde and UF foam for distribution to all state health
departments." Id.
225. 243 J.A.M.A. 1697 (1980). See generally 47 Fed. Reg. 14,366 (1982).
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Even where the input of compensated parties has not altered the agency's
views or contemplated course of action, it has fostered improved decisionmaking. Comments that have been "well reasoned and favorable to the
agency's position" 226 have given the agency added assurance of its propriety
and lent support to the agency approach. Contributions that have challenged
the administrative perspective have kept the agencies honest, requiring reasoned responses, forcing staff to do their homework, and preventing decisionmakers from accomodating regulated interests too readily. 227 While the enumerated benefits are not unique to reimbursed participation-they also accrue
from the unfunded involvement of interested parties 228-compensation has
drawn more interests into the administrative forum, especially those formerly
excluded, and has enhanced the quality of agency decisionmaking.-229
B. The Identified Deficiencies
There have also been negative experiences with participant reimbursement. Understandably, less documentation of this aspect of funding exists,
because agencies, seeking to secure continued congressional support, have no
interest in emphasizing program shortfalls. Moreover, only a small number of
extra-agency analyses are available, and critics have focused upon deficiencies
in the administration of programs, rather than substantive inadequacies. 230
Nevertheless, there is evidence indicating that some compensated participants
have made minimal contributions or have provided misleading input, 231 so
226. NHTSA Study, supra note 201, at 2.
227. See the testimony of FfC Chairman Pertschuk and NHTSA Administrator Claybrook
in S. 104 Hearings, supra note 94, at 174-200.
228. See, e.g., NRC Report, supra note 28; Public Participation Study, supra note 17;
Gellhorn, supra note 6; Cramton, supra note 8; Note, supra note 8; S. Rep. No. 863, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1976).
229. The positive contributions to decisionmaking made by reimbursed participants can have
ancillary benefits for the decisional process as well. For example, efficacious funded activity
"may save the agency from serious substantive error and from serious delay," thus yielding
concomitant savings in time, money, and effort. See NRC Report, supra note 28, app. F at 7
(statement of Malcolm Mason), reprinted in Chambers, Increasing Citizen Participation in Administrative Proceedings: Can Federal Financing Bridge the Costs Barrier?, 30 Case W. Res. L.
Rev. 33, 67 (1979); S. 104 Hearings, supra note 94, at 189 (statement of NHTSA Administrator
Claybrook); cf. S. 2715 Hearings, supra note 18, at 18, 122 (statements of United States District
Judge Richey & EPA Administrator Ruckelshaus) (reimbursement would expedite administrative
process by reducing number of appeals taken from agency action); S. 270 Hearings, supra note
18, at 90 (statement of Anthony Reisman) (reimbursement would expedite proceedings by providing citizens with resources to present affirmative case rather than having to rely upon procedural
devices such as discovery and cross-examination).
230. See, e.g., S. 104 Hearings, supra note 94, at 200-24 (statements of Ben Blackburn,
Daniel Popeo, and Richard Leighton); Oversight of the Federal Trade Commission: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. for Consumers of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 265-68 (1979) [hereinafter cited as FfC Oversight Hearings]
(statement of Jeffrey Joseph).
231. It seems fair to surmise that nothing of consequence occurred in a number of proceedings, because compensated involvement in them was deemed insufficiently worthwhile to warrant
inclusion in agency self-evaluations generally prepared as advocacy documents. Indeed, NHTSA
apparently could find so little efficacious funded involvement in its proceedings that the administration neglected to submit a report on its program as mandated by H.R. Rep. No. 1329, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1978).
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that reimbursement has not invariably improved the quality of agency decisionmaking, and that funding has not always brought previously uninvolved
interests into the administrative forum. 232
1. Duplicative and Flawed Input. The charges most frequently leveled at
compensated involvement are that the submissions of some funded participants have been redundant or of inferior quality. Reimbursed parties have
offered information, methodologies, or arguments supplied by other entities
or generated by an agency's own staff. NHTSA probably would have learned
of all the problems widely discussed in a public meeting on truck safety, save
one, without funding a single participant, 233 and CAB staff contended that an
economic assessment performed by a compensated expert in the International
Air Transport Association hearing added nothing to the analysis provided by
the agency's own economic witnesses. 234 Moreover, reimbursed parties have
often adopted positions similar to those of the agencies. 235 Compensated
entities sometimes have not been good sources of original scientific or technical data 236 and have occasionally provided inaccurate technical input. The
NHTSA observed that funded participants in its fuel economy standards
initiative failed to present extensive facts documenting their opinions 237 and
that a reimbursed organization's analysis of the comparative effectiveness of
different types of automobile restraints was "demonstrably incorrect in major
respects." 238 Surveys conducted by two compensated parties in an FTC
rulemaking were found to be deficient 239 and the Department of Energy
232. Analysis of the bad experiences does not depreciate the merits of the reimbursement
enterprise, and indeed most of the difficulties encountered could reasonably have been anticipated. It is important, however, to identify those problems that are attributable to inexperience
with an untested concept and those that are the fixed costs of what may otherwise be a profitable
undertaking.
233. Stellato & Wright, supra note 201, at 27.
234. Memorandum from Competition Maintenance Division to Glen Robards, Jr., Jan. 15,
1980, in CAB Study, supra note 201. One explanation for this may be that the procedural rules
applied in the particular proceeding apparently changed considerably in the course of that
proceeding. Telephone interview with Cornish Hitchcock, Attorney for Aviation Consumer
Action Project (Aug. 6, 1981). See generally International Air Transport Ass'n, CAB Order No.
81-5-27 (May 6, 1981).
235. See, e.g., S. 104 Hearings, supra note 94, at 158 (statement of Senator Simpson); FI'C
Oversight Hearings, supra note 230, at 277 (statement of Jeffrey Joseph).
236. "[C]onsumer groups, often in an adversary posture toward industry, tend to have the
least experience of all. Though they may appeal to competing elements within industry for help,
they frequently are dependent upon the agency and outside experts for information." Breyer,
Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 Harv.
L. Rev. 549, 572 (1979); see also FI'C Oversight Hearings, supra note 230, at 155 (statement of
Senator Danforth); S. 104 Hearings, supra note 94, at 159 (statement of Senator Simpson). The
mere fact that entities Jack substantive expertise, however, does not necessarily mean that they will
be ineffective. Professor Boyer and FI'C Chairman Pertschuk have praised the funded participation of the Americans for Democratic Action in the FI'C opthalmic goods and funeral practices
rulemakings. See B. Boyer, supra note 200, at 142; S. 1020 Hearings, supra note 208, at 6-7. See
generally American Optometric Ass'n v. FI'C, 626 F.2d 896 (D.C. Cir. 1980); 40 Fed. Reg. 39,901
(1975); 42 Fed. Reg. 41,651 (1977).
237. NHTSA Study, supra note 201, at 11.
238. Id. at 13. Nevertheless, NHTSA observed that the "analysis provided the agency with
the opportunity to rebute [sic] decisively the position of those opposed to air bags." Id.
239. See FI'C Oversight Hearings, supra note 230, at 155 (statement of Senator Danforth).
See generally 46 Fed. Reg. 48,710 (1981).
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concluded that one model for heating oil overcharges presented by a funded
group was significantly flawed. 240
2. Failure to Expand the Participant Base. Reimbursement programs
have been criticized as well for failing to achieve their full pluralistic promise.
Government compensation has not always brought new voices to the decisional process. Some support has been paid to entities that had participated in
prior proceedings without assistance. 241 Little funding has reached grassroots
groups and individuals, 242 and a considerable amount of money has been
awarded to a small number of recipients, often involved in multiple proceedings before the same agency. 243
This information raises questions that go to the essence of the compensation rationale. Concentration of funding in a few participants jeopardizes the
desired appearance of administrative openness and sacrifices the democratic
ideal underlying the reimbursement concept for perceived technical competence. 244 Compensating parties that can pay their own way 245 violates both
the spirit of the funding idea and the letter of the law governing agency
reimbursement.
240. OHA Decision, supra note 219, at 83.
While there is no indication that erroneous data submitted by funded participants has been
relied upon in reaching a final decision, at the very least nominal or negative contributions impose
delay on the administrative proceedings. Indeed, a principal objection to institution of the
reimbursement concept has been that compensated participants will cause delay. See, e.g., S. 270
Hearings, supra note 18, at 113-14 (statement of William Cuddy); H.R. 3361 Hearings, supra
note 93, at 630-31 (statement of George Gleason). Even where the participation of funded parties
is ostensibly efficacious, that participation-by "multiplying the range of interests that must be
considered, by underscoring the complexity of the issues involved, and by developing a more
complete record of alternatives and competing considerations"-actually "may reduce the extent
to which procedures will effectively control agency discretion in decisionmaking." Stewart, supra
note 5, at 1777.
241. Examples are the Center for Auto Safety at NHTSA and the Aviation Consumer Action
Project at CAB. See NHTSA Study, supra note 201, at 12; CAB Study, supra note 201, at 3.
242. See B. Boyer, supra note 200, at 125. Professor Boyer also found that a considerable
number of compensated entities were located in Washington, D.C., or California. Id.; see also
FTC Oversight Hearings, supra note 230, at 154 (statement of Senator Danforth).
243. Professor Boyer found that "to some degree, the statistics bear out the contention that
compensation awards have been relatively concentrated in a few applicants" at the FTC. B.
Boyer, supra note 200, at 125; see also FTC Oversight Hearings, supra note 230, at 158-60
(statement of Senator Simpson). There has been some, but considerably less, concentration of
funding at a few other agencies. See, e.g., NHTSA Study, supra note 201, at 4-6. It is often
claimed as well that the entities in which reimbursement has been concentrated have espoused the
agency's position in the proceeding for which compensation was granted. Professor Boyer
observed that "if the [FTC] compensation program was designed to achieve a balance of pro-rule
and anti-rule witnesses, it seems to have had little effect." B. Boyer, supra note 200, at 116.
Numerous witnesses before congressional committees have testified that "funds were disbursed in
many instances, to specific individuals or groups in agreement with the [agency's] position" and
in rare circumstances to regulated interests. S. 104 Hearings, supra note 94, at 280 (statement of
Richard Leighton).
244. An important theme in Professor Boyer's article is the fundamental tension between
democracy and technocracy. See B. Boyer, supra note 200.
245. Opponents of participant funding have been particularly critical of awards to groups
with extensive membership, who it is said, should have sufficient resources to pay the cost of their
participation. See FTC Oversight Hearings, supra note 230, at 154 (statement of Senator Danforth); S. 104 Hearings, supra note 94, at 280 (statement of Richard Leighton). The critics have
also alleged that certain small groups have been formed exclusively for the purpose of securing
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C. The Problems in Perspective
1. The Refinements. It obviously is difficult to choose applicants whose
contributions will most improve administrative decisionmaking. There are
measures the agencies can take, and have implemented, to improve both the
quality and diversity of compensated participation. Duplication 246 can be
curtailed by apprising reimbursed entities of the materials that are possessed
by the agencies or that have been, or are likely to be, submitted by other
parties. Timing participant awards, 247 so that the parties chosen have adequate
opportunity to prepare without unduly delaying the proceedings, is a logistical
problem that the agencies have tried to solve. 248 Agencies that have not
always been sufficiently rigorous in auditing recipients can, and are attempting to, upgrade their oversight. 249 The selection process can be expected to
improve as experience with funding programs accumulates. These improvements not only should enhance the quality of compensated contributions but
also can broaden the spectrum of viewpoints that participant funding could
elicit. As the Administrative Conference, commenting on the FTC compensation effort, has observed, "reimbursement programs are likely to be most

public reimbursement monies. See FfC Oversight Hearings, supra note 230, at 155, 161 (statements of Senators Danforth & Simpson). Moreover, it often has been alleged that few of the
recipients selected actually represent the public. See S. 104 Hearings, supra note 94, at 157, 214
(statements of Senator Simpson and Ben Blackburn); FfC Oversight Hearings, supra note 230, at
153 (statement of Senator Danforth).
246. The NHTSA meeting on heavy-duty truck safety discussed supra in text accompanying
note 233 is illustrative. Many participants were funded to talk about safety problems without
being apprised of what other participants might say. It is not surprising, therefore, that considerable duplication occurred. See Stellato & Wright, supra note 201, at 25-28. Duplication of the
agency's position may also be a consequence of the structure of the proceedings. The confusion
that results when the procedural rules are changed may mislead a funded participant into
duplicating the efforts of agency staff. See supra note 234. In certain rulemaking proceedings, the
procedures by which substantive regulations are developed may make it "unrealistic to expect that
public participation ... [will] produce anything beyond modest expansion or contraction of rule
coverage." B. Boyer, supra note 200, at 135. Also, the agency staff may already have developed
an excellent proposal and may only be funding participants to ascertain whether it might be
improved. This may well be what happened in the asbestos proceeding discussed supra in note 214
and accompanying text. In the latter situation funding may be ill-advised.
247. NHTSA's experience indicated that "[w]ithout sufficient time to prepare, the contributions of [funded participants] are generally limited by the complexity of the ideas involved in the
proceeding." NHTSA Study, supra note 201, at 3. As to the FfC, see B. Boyer, supra note 200,
at 86; see also 1 C.F.R. § 305.79-5 (1981). For thorough exploration of the timing difficulties, see
B. Boyer, supra note 200, at 86-88.
248. The time frames for applicant selection included in most regulations are illustrative.
See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 12.5(b) (1981) (USDA); 21 C.F.R. §§ 10.210(a), 10.215(a), (d), (e), I0.220(a),
(c) (1981) (FDA). Some agencies have even made explicit provision for expedited procedures in
extraordinary circumstances. See, e.g., id. at § I0.210(a)(l) (FDA).
249. The "financial auditing aspects of the FfC's compensation program appeared to be
fairly well established by the middle of 1979." B. Boyer, supra note 200, at 95; accord S. 104
Hearings, supra note 94, at 194 (statement of FfC Chairman Pertschuk). The experience of other
agencies seems similar, but most acted more expeditiously than the Commission. See generally
NHTSA Study, supra note 201, at 6-7; EPA Study, supra note 213. Agency sponsorship of, and
participation in, the national symposium on citizen participation mentioned supra in note 200, as
well as the substantive content of the papers presented at the conference, indicate that agencies
can refine the quality of auditing recipient performance to ensure that promised input has been
provided.
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valuable in agencies or proceedings where there is a substantial difference
between the positions of the agency staff and groups seeking reimbursement." 250 Giving funding preference to responsible opponents of agency
positions should minimize duplication and make compensated involvement
more diverse. 251
The agencies can also attempt to decrease the concentration of funding
grants. The initial experience of some agencies that awarded assistance to a
small group of recipients is partially attributable to failure to publicize funding availability. 252 Concentration can be reduced by implementing, as some
agencies have, outreach programs to inform potentially qualified parties of

250. 1 C.F.R. § 305.80-1 (1981) (FfC).
251. The criticisms referred to supra in note 243 notwithstanding, most funded participants
have in fact opposed agency positions. Even in the FTC proceedings, in which especially in the
early days of the program funded consumer groups seem to have allied with the Commission
staff, "the great majority of aid recipients have opposed staff proposals in one way or another."
B. Boyer, supra note 200, at 132; see also l C.F.R. § 305.80-1 (1981) (FTC); H.R. 3361 Hearings,
supra note 93, at 500 (statement of FTC Chairman Collier); S. 104 Hearings, supra note 94, at 176
(statement of FTC Chairman Pertschuk); S.1020 Hearings, supra note 208, at 14 (same). Individuals and groups compensated by other agencies have almost always challenged the perspectives
advocated by staff. NHTSA has observed that the "points of view expressed by the funded
participants are generally independent of the agency's views, and may conflict with or criticize the
positions of the agency and the industry." NHTSA Study, supra note 201, at 2. More specifically,
the recipient of the largest sum awarded by the FDA was known to be a vociferous opponent of
the perspective of the Bureau of Foods in the aspartame matter, see supra note 218 and accompanying text, and may have been selected for that very reason.
In certain instances, congruity between agency views and those of funded participants may
have resulted from bias in the selection process. For example, some evidence suggests that, during
the early period of experimentation with funding at the FTC, staff working on the substantive
matter for which reimbursement was requested may have influenced the compensation determination. In other agencies as well, officials charged with selecting funding applicants have consulted
staff involved in the initiative for which funding was sought, because the staff have often been the
best sources of information about the particular proceeding. This contact is not altogether
harmful, and indeed some such communication may be necessary. B. Boyer, supra note 200, at
79-81; 1 C.F.R. § 305-79.5 (1981) (FTC). To guard against improper intra-agency influence in the
selection process while allowing for some interaction, a few agencies have isolated decisionmakers
from staff and have required decisionmakers to secure information about the substantive proceeding from presiding officers. Funding responsibility can be placed in the agency head. See, e.g., 15
C.F.R. § 904 (1981) (NOAA). Alternatively, the presiding officer can serve in a recommendatory
capacity with final decisionmaking authority vested in entities such as the Office of General
Counsel or a three-person Evaluation Board. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § l.17(d) (1981) (FfC); 21
C.F.R. §§ 10.215-20 (1981) (FDA); cf. 7 C.F.R. §§ 12.2, 12.5 (1981) (head of each USDA
component presents analysis to Evaluation Board). The FDA approach was to disqualify Evaluation Board members who were participating in the substantive proceeding. See 21 C.F.R. §
10.220(a) (1981). If necessary, agencies could promulgate rules governing inappropriate contacts,
such as those that enforce "separation of functions." See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 10.55(c) (1981)
(FDA); cf. S. 1020 Hearings, supra note 208, at 13 (statement of FTC Chairman Pertschuk) (FfC
staff directed to avoid efforts to intervene improperly in funding decision); see also CAB Study,
supra note 201, at 7.
A more extreme approach would be to place responsibility for choosing funding recipients in
the hands of a government body outside the agency, but the Administrative Conference has
recommended that funding responsibility remain with the agencies. 1 C.F.R. § 305-79.5 (1981)
(FfC).
252. As to the FTC, see B. Boyer, supra note 200, at 83-86. A similar situation prevailed at
other agencies. For example, CPSC received few applications immediately after the program was
instituted, primarily because the Commission failed to publicize the program. Interview with Alan
Shakin, Office of General Counsel, CPSC, Feb. 3, 1981.
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their eligibility for financial assistance 253 or by de-emphasizing prior administrative advocacy as a participant selection criterion. 254
2. The Constraints. There are limits, however, to the efficacy and desirability of measures that could be instituted to remedy the perceived deficiencies in compensation programs. The inherent cost of eliciting contributions
from entities lacking the expertise and experience of regulated interests or
agency staffs is that some of the funded participation will be mediocre or even
faulty. 255 It is, moreover, unrealistic to expect that every reimbursed party
will offer new insights. 256 The crucial issue is not that there may be inferior
input, but its extent and the degree to which it offsets the advantages of
compensation. Thus far, experience demonstrates and administrative opinion
indicates that the funding experiments have been worthwhile; a realistic attitude towards the reimbursement concept requires acceptance of its attendant
functional costs.
Distributing compensation awards among diverse interests is certainly
desirable. Where pursuit of that goal conflicts with the need to secure accurate, reliable, comprehensive, and cost-effective input, however, it may be
necessary to compromise the ideal of the broadest based participation. Often
the pool of qualified potential participants familiar with a particular agency's
concerns is small. 257 As Professor Boyer has observed, "if the purpose [of
the funding programs] is to produce testimony based on sound research and
expert legal representation, then it seems efficient to prefer groups and lawyers who already know the ropes and have demonstrated their competence in
prior proceedings." 258 There is economic gain as well as an assurance of

253. As to the FfC, see B. Boyer, supra note 207, at 85. An agency such as the FDA, that
attracted few applicants during more than two years of operation despite admirable attempts at
publicizing the program, may need to expand efforts or develop new approaches. For helpful
suggestions on encouraging participation, see 1 C.F.R. § 305-79.5 (1981) (FfC).
254. ·see, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 12.6(d) (1981) (USDA); 42 Fed. Reg. 30,482 (1977) (FfC); see B.
Boyer, supra note 200, at 131. Restrictions might also be placed on the amount of the award to
any one participant, as Congress has done in FfC proceedings. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b)(l)(c)
(Supp. IV 1980).
255. Even substantively ineffective participation can be helpful. For example, FfC Commissioner Pitofsky offered the following remarks about compensated participants: "I would say in
most instances, their position did not prevail. And yet there's not been an occasion in which they
didn't sharpen the analysis .•• at times, their positions may be extreme, but they expose
considerations that would not otherwise come to the surface." S. 1020 Hearings, supra note 208,
at 15; cf. NHTSA Study, supra note 201, at 13 (existence of funded party's analysis that was
"demonstrably incorrect in major respects" provided agency with opportunity to rebut position
of those opposed to airbags). And, there may be value in simply having previously unrepresented
interests participate in administrative proceedings, enhancing the perception of a democratic
process.
256. Perhaps all that can fairly be asked of reimbursed entities is that they effectively present
their views to agency decisionmakers. See B. Boyer, supra note 200, at 136. Professor Boyer, in
assessing the "quality of representation provided by the compensated groups" at the FfC found
that the "compensated consumer groups made a respectable showing." Id. at 143, 145. The
remarks of the Administrative Conference were considerably stronger. See 1 C.F.R. § 305.80-1
(1981) (FfC); see also NHTSA Study, supra note 201, at 1 (compensated entities "were able to
make a·meaningful contribution").
257. See B. Boyer, supra note 200, at 130 & n.300 and sources cited therein.
258. Id. at 129.
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quality in selecting experienced applicants, whose start-up and operational
costs are generally lower and who can use materials and methods developed in
other proceedings. 259 A balance must be struck between experience and
diversity, and such factors as the size of the qualified applicant pool and the
technical complexity of the issues will affect the determination of whether to
choose the neophyte or the practiced participant.
It may also be necessary to compromise when scrutinizing the fiscal
condition of applicants, reviewing the performance of those selected, and
assessing the quality of program administration. To maintain the integrity of
reimbursement efforts, agencies must enforce standards of financial eligibility, 260 monitor recipient input, 261 and analyze program operation. But performance of these tasks is costly. While eligibility criteria can be refined, there
are limits to the resources that an agency should devote to examining applicant
need and to determining how far an agency should delve into the private
financial affairs of funding applicants. 262 Financial ability tests must eventually become questions of credibility and reasonableness, 263 and undeserving
entities may occasionally secure an award. 264 Evaluating the substantive
contributions of individual compensated parties and the administration of
funding programs is both difficult and expensive. 265 During the initial stages
of operation, less rigorous study that still affords a general sense of reimburse-

259. Id., citing Galanter, Afterward: Explaining Litigation, 9 Law & Soc'y Rev. 347 (1975),
and Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 Law &
Soc'y Rev. 95 (1974). With respect to the FfC, whose proceedings require considerable participant expertise, the Administrative Conference concluded: "[T]he fact that a relatively small
number of participants received substantial compensation in several proceedings does not demonstrate a defect in the design or implementation of the program." 1 C.F.R. § 305.80-l{c) (1981).
260. The eligibility formulas used in the funding programs focus on the inability of applicants to finance their participation as well as the substantiality of their proposed contributions.
See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 904.3(a) (1981) (NOAA); 7 C.F.R. § 21.5(d) (1981) (USDA); 21 C.F.R. §
10.220(c)(3) (1981) (FDA). For comprehensive discussion of the criteria, see Chambers, supra
note 229, at 40-44, 49-53; B. Boyer, supra note 200, at 10-73.
261. Agency regulations provide for denial of claims for payment or recovery of money paid
where the entity whose application was approved initially "has not provided the representation
for which the application was approved." 7 C.F.R. § 12.8(b) (1981) (USDA); accord 21 C.F.R. §
10.280(c) (1981) (FDA). But, it is not clear how agencies would determine that contributions were
not as promised. Even if agency officials could objectively gauge substandard performance, they
may be reluctant to commit agency resources to litigation over claim denial or payment recovery.
262. "Conceptually, applying the financial inability standard involves two related inquiries-does the applicant have enough resources to participate now, and does it have workable ways
of raising additional money-that are likely to be both sensitive and beyond the expertise of an
agency like the FfC." B. Boyer, supra note 200, at 65. For further discussion of the problem of
governmental intrusion, see id. at 65-68, 70-73; 1 C.F.R. § 305-79.5 (1981) (FfC).
263. See B. Boyer, supra note 200, at 108. "Considering these many problems," Professor
Boyer concluded, "the FfC was reasonable in according a relatively minor role to the financial
inability standard, and in accepting at face value applicants' assertions of financial need." Id.
"Other agencies operating direct funding programs appear to have adopted similar approaches."
Id.
264. Critics of funding often cite Consumers Union, which is allegedly a "$20 million
operation." S. 104 Hearings, supra note 94, at 203 (statement of Richard Leighton}; S. 270
Hearings, supra note 18, at 9-10 (statement of Senator Thurmond). The FfC has also funded
trade associations. B. Boyer, supra note 200, at 102-03.
265. See supra notes 202 & 204.

952

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:906

ment's efficacy may be preferable, so that agency resources more profitably
used to fund participants or administer programs will not be dissipated.
3. Operational Costs. An important factor to be considered in examining
the legitimacy and desirability of participant compensation is its cost, both in
terms of money actually paid recipients and of the administrative demands on
agency staff and resources. Experience has demonstrated that the benefits of
reimbursement programs have been attained with relatively little strain on
agency budget or bureaucracy. The programs have proven inexpensive and
easy to administer and have generally been operated in a competent manner, 266 although citizen funding began as, and remains, an experimental idea.
Perhaps more significantly, the expenses of administration and financial assistance have been reasonably contained. Start-up costs, attributable to
promulgation of rules creating programs and publicity, have been rather
low, 267 and can be expected to decline as agencies instituting compensation
efforts capitalize on the experience of those that have previously developed
programs. 268 Day-to-day administrative expenses have also been reasonable, 269 because the skills and personnel needed to run the efforts already exist
within the agencies 270 and because experience brings cost efficiency.
The primary program costs have been, of course, the actual money paid
to participants, but here too outlay has been modest. Only the FTC has spent

266. The Administrative Conference, in recommending that the FTC effort continue, observed that even though the Commission "lack[ed] specific statutory guidance and the benefit of
other agencies' experience, [and] progressed slowly, through trial and error over a two-year
period, ... [the] Commission's present system of administration appears to implement faithfully
and efficiently the reimbursement program established by the statute." I C.F.R. § 305.79-5
(1981). NHTSA found that its program could "be administered with only minor administrative
burdens so long as it is adequately staffed." NHTSA Study, supra note 201, at 3; accord CAB
Study, supra note 201, at I, 7.
267. For example, the CAB estimated that it paid "$38,325 to complete the rulemaking [and]
$7,053 to develop a pamphlet explaining the application process." CAB Study, supra note 201, at
6, 9. All of the CAB figures include a "IOOo/o overhead factor." Id. at 9. The attorney who
developed the CPSC funding regulation stated that the "start-up" effort required a "small
amount of resources." Telephone interview with Alan Shakin, Office of General Counsel, CPSC,
Dec. I, 1981. The attorney who developed the NHTSA regulation estimated expenditures to be
"$50,000 maximum." Telephone interview with Richard Lorr, Office of General Counsel, DOT,
Dec. I, 1981. Start-up costs appear to be no more than those incurred in commencing other
similar programs.
268. A number of the agencies appear to have drawn on the experience of other agencies in
structuring their own programs. Compare 21 C.F.R. §§ 10.200-.290 (1981) (FDA) and 7 C.F.R.
pt. 12 (1981) (USDA) with 15 C.F.R. pt. 904 (1981) (NOAA).
269. The cost of day-to-day administration at the CAB during a nine-month period was
approximately $2,600, representing the expense incurred by the Evaluation Committee in processing eight applications submitted in three proceedings. CAB Study, supra note 201, at 9. This does
not include approximately $700 spent in evaluating the program staff or salary allocated to the
program. Telephone interview with Glen Robards, Jr. (Nov. 24, 1981). The CPSC spent approximately $20,700 to administer its effort during the final year of operation. This included the costs
of processing more than fifty applications submitted in three proceedings. Interview with Barbara
Rosenfeld, Office of Public Participation, CPSC (Nov. 24, 1981).
270. For example, FDA has relied upon personnel in its Office of Management and Operations to process applications and conduct fiscal audits, skills that the personnel had acquired in
processing and auditing grant applications. See generally 21 C.F.R. § 10.280-.290 (1981) (FDA);
FDA Study, supra note 218, at§ 2.
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more than $65,000 on compensation during a single year, 271 and most agencies
have paid out considerably less than they had originally allocated. 272 The cost
of funding specific parties has been comparatively inexpensive, substantially
below the market rate for similar private-sector services. 273 Indeed, in many
situations, citizen reimbursement appears cheaper than the alternative mechanisms-augmenting agency staff and hiring outside contractors-traditionally
employed to procure additional decisional input. 274 Public participants can
be paid to provide assistance in substantive fields where the agency does not
"want to build up the kind of permanent staff expertise that [it] would have to
have to issue intelligent regulations." 275 Because most applicants funded are
already involved in, and knowledgeable about, their areas of particular concern and because they are highly motivated, 276 they are also willing and able to
charge much less than government contractors. 277

271. In 1977, NHTSA paid $63,389 in fees and expenses. NHTSA Study, supra note 201, at
6. Most other agencies have expended considerably less. For example, FDA spent approximately
$7,300 during a six-month period. See FDA Study, supra note 218, Table II. CPSC spent
approximately $25,000 for fees and expenses during the final year that its program was operating.
See CPSC Study, supra note 214, at 1. The FTC, however, has paid participants as much as
$500,000 for fees and expenses in one year. Telephone interview with Barry Rubin, Office of
General Counsel, FTC, Nov. 23, 1981.
272. For example, FDA allocated $250,000 for the initial year and paid only $7,300 in the
first half of that period. See FDA Study, supra note 218, at 3 & Table II. Similarly, the CAB spent
only $28,400 of the $150,000 appropriated for a one-year demonstration project. See CAB Study,
supra note 201, at 1-2. Moreover, some agencies have actually paid less money than was initially
awarded recipients. For example, NHTSA awarded $56,000 and "only had to pay $43,000" in
1978. S. 104 Hearings, supra note 94, at 189 (statement ofNHTSA Administrator Claybrook); see
also NHTSA Study, supra note 201, at 6.
273. Many agencies have paid attorneys according to a "fee scale extrapolated from government lawyers' salaries which [have] sliding maximum limits based on the attorney's years of
experience after law school." B. Boyer, supra note 200, at 91. Similarly, many agencies have
"pegged" the rate for expert witnesses to salaries paid government employees with comparable
experience. On compensation levels in specific funding programs, see 21 C.F.R. § 10.250-.280
(1981) (FDA); 15 C.F.R. § 904.5(c) (1981) (NOAA); 42 Fed. Reg. 30,485 (1977) (FTC).
274. It may also be cheaper than some of the other proposals considered by Congress in the
early 1970's to provide increased consumer representation in agency proceedings, such as "the
creation of special 'public counsels' in certain areas which affect all citizens ... [or] of an
independent 'Public Counsel Corporation,' to provide advocacy on a broad spectrum of issues."
S. Rep. No. 94-863, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976). Strengthening existing consumer offices, see S.
104 Hearings, supra note 94, at 279 (statement of Richard Leighton), would probably be less
costly, but also less effective. For discussion of these and other less effective alternatives, see NRC
Report, supra note 28, at 131-67.
275. Hearings on Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations for
1980 Before the Subcomm. on Transportation of the House Appropriations Comm., 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. pt. 6, at 287 (1979) (statement of Reuben Robertson, CAB Bureau of Consumer
Protection Director); cf. H.R. Rep. No. 1164, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1978) ("direct utilization
of •.. consumer expertise and resources will enable CPSC to 'bootstrap' its staff on the technical
matters, which should result in higher quality standards").
276. See S. 104 Hearings, supra note 94, at 188 (statement of NHTSA Administrator
Claybrook).
277. For example, a consumer center "received $2,486 to provide information on the
hazards related to the presence of asbestos in art materials," a project that staff estimated "would
have cost in excess of $25,000" had CPSC "contracted for this work." CPSC Study, supra note
214, at 2.
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Against this backdrop of cost efficiency and financial responsibility, even
the more compelling charges leveled at participant reimbursement seem less
significant. At limited expense, the administrative sector has acquired experience with a promising mechanism for generating information and shaping
perspectives and from which it has reaped demonstrable, though not unequivocal, benefit in specific proceedings.

D. Experience, Experiment, and Reimbursement Authority
While participant compensation has demonstrated promise, the concept
is not equally beneficial in all administrative contexts. 278 Selection procedures, other operative techniques, resource outlay, and even the advisability
of reimbursement itself may vary from agency to agency. Extensive and more
rigorous study is needed to review the course of the funding programs, to
explore ways of enhancing their effectiveness, and to identify those circumstances in which compensation is likely to be of greatest benefit. 279 Independent, expert evaluation, 280 with defined impact parameters, 281 conducted for a
sufficient period, will be needed for definitive assessment of program performance. Pending such comprehensive analysis, and perhaps postponing it
until more experience accumulates, the reimbursement experiment should
continue.
Because the optimal conditions for funding of participants have yet to be
identified, it is logical to explore the compensation concept with a maximum
degree of flexibility and opportunity for administrative innovation. Comprehensive legislative guidance is not only improbable and difficult to provide; it
also may be unnecessary at this point. Congress should continue specifically
authorized reimbursement programs on a selective basis, maintaining those
that have improved decisionmaking and have been well administered, and
should support institution of programs in agencies that may especially benefit
from funded involvement. 282 Congress should refrain from imposing restrictions on participant compensation through the appropriations process. 283

278. FrC Chairman Collier, in the context of testifying that "funded participation substantially benefits the proceedings," observed that "not all projects have been equally successful," as
"might easily have been expected." H.R. 3361 Hearings, supra note 93, at 500-01.
279. In identifying circumstances that might auger well for a successful compensation program, consideration should be accorded to factors such as the type of agency, the type of
proceedings, the type of issues presented for resolution, and the type of contribution to be made.
280. See Rosenbaum, supra note 200, at 42.
281. For example, Professor Rosenbaum offers a "rudimentary impact model," which
divides the "policy goals for citizen participation into three broad categories: those relating to
policy makers, substantive policy decisions themselves and the procedures for making policy,"
and indicates that "there may also be 'spillovers.' " Id. at 35-36. It bears repeating, however,
that the relative efficacy of reimbursed involvement is a function of many variables, and that any
analysis must necessarily be polycentric. See Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92
Harv. L. Rev. 353, 394-404 (1978).
282. Reimbursed public involvement in the CPSC "offeror" process, though recently eliminated see supra note 90, appears to have offered many advantages, see CPSC Study, supra note
214, and the CAB experiment seems to have been quite promising, see CAB study, supra note 201.
283. See supra notes 82-85 & 90 and accompanying text.
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If this guidance were followeq; the implied reimbursement. principle
would afford sufficient flexibility for additional experimentation, Assuming
agencies' existing legislative mandates are br.oad enough to satisfy the implied·
funding rationale, the agencies themselves can best determine whether· com-.
pensation has the potential to enhance their decisionmaking and if the projected benefits justify divertjng agency resources. The collective exercise_ of
administrative discretion probably would result in moderately scaled, diverse
programs, supporting participant input of varied content and quality. These
programs should facilitate additio..nal testing and refinement. of the reimbursement concept without committing._ the government to any fixed mode. 284
So long as the funding efforts are modest and responsibly managed,.
contribute to the decisional process, and do not interfere with accomplishment of traditional agency responsibilities, Congress and the courts should be
receptive to these experiments. Judges should prohibit programs instituted
pursuant to implied power only where the compensation effort tjolates the
general tenor of the particular agency's statutory mandate, either because
that mandate has been drawn narrowly by Congress or because the program
is so insubstantial or so valueless that it contravenes sound administi:ative
policy. Proscribing agency initiatives on the basis of analogies to fee shifting
or ambiguous legislative expressions, however, is unwarranted. Statutory
authority and the existing administrative structure are sufficiently exp~nsive
to accommodate reimbursement pursuant to implied agency power. The
funds earmarked for compensation are spent in the public interest and for the
public benefit. The information and experience acquired promise advantages
for the individual agencies today and for the functioning of the entire ~dmin
istrative sector in the future.
CONCLUSION

Five years of agency experimentation w~th participant funding have.
shown the concept to be a valuable and cost-effective means of improving
administrative decisionmaking. Unfortunately, that exploration has virtually
been ended by judicial interpretation, antiregulatory reaction, budget-cutting,
and bureaucratic caution. If Congress and the present Administration have
correctly perceived that part of what is wrong with government regulation is
agency unresponsiveness to the needs of the American people, their negative
approach to the reimbursement concept is ironic. Rather than being elimi.,,
nated, this promising, inexpensive mechanism for improving administrative
decisions by making agencies more responsive should be expanded and refined.
284. It would be especially unwise for Congress to adopt legislation expressly proscribing
agency reimbursement "unless specifically authorized by law," like the bill approved by the
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee in 1981 and the full Senate in 1982 and by the House
Judiciary Committee in 1980. See generally supra notes 95 & 96 and accompanying text.
Of course, such action would eliminate the flexibility needed by agencies to experiment with
funding. It also will be less expensive to permit agencies to compensate public participants
pursuant to implied authority when the agencies deem funded involvement necessary to the
decisional process, rather than to require that individual agencies secure congressional permission
every time one of them desires to reimburse participants.

